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Abstract 
The theme of this study is freedom and development. One of the 
crucial points is the relation of freedom and development to 
different degrees of regulation and to the provision of substantive 
rights in a given society. The importance of formal and informal 
institutions as constraints on individual freedom but also as a 
necessary condition for individual freedom and co-operation is 
illustrated. 
The theoretical framework I am building on combines two distinct 
but reconcilable approaches to this topic: Amartya Sen's 
Development as Freedom and F.A. Hayek's The Constitution of 
Liberty. It is supplemented by Hernando DeSoto's The Myste1y of 
Capital and some ideas of the New Institutional Economists. 
By applying this framework to developments within a transition 
· economy - the Ukraine, and in particular to the agricultural sector 
of the country - I try to show both the basic challenges that 
transition economies face and how far theoretical approaches to 
freedom and development are actually applicable to practical 
issues. The problems the Ukraine is facing on its way to a free 
market economy, especially in the area of privatisation and 
liberalisation, are largely the result of arbitrary regulation and 
coercive state interference. Rent-seeking and corruption are a 
consequence of creeping administrative discretion and have 
impeded the development of the country tremendously. These 
problems are enforced by the neglect of substantial rights such as 
political freedoms, social opportunities and protective security. 
Thus both the regulatory environment - the rule of law - and the 
actual freedoms that people enjoy need to be improved. A stable 
institutional framework that avoids both over-regulation and under-
regulation needs to be created. Within such a framework people 
will be able to act freely and lead a life they have reason to value. 
The German Advisory Group on Economic Reform and members 
of the Department for Agricultural Economics of the University of 
Gottingen have largely provided the information about 
developments and policies in the Ukraine. Although I did not 
engage in proper empirical work myself- and as a philosopher I 
probably should not have done so - my visits to the Ukraine have 
helped me to process the variety of empirical data. 
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Introduction 
Back to the Rough Ground! 
"We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so 
in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because 
of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need 
friction. Back to the rough ground!" 
(Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § I 07) 
October 200 I - I am travelling with forty young agrarians through 
the Western part of the Ukraine. Our trip leads us to Lviv, Ternopil, 
Vinnycia, Cherkassy and Kiev. We are visiting various agricultural 
enterprises, slaughterhouses, dairies, an academy for agriculture 
and an agricultural research institute. 
Not surprisingly, I am the only philosophy student in this group of 
agricultural economists, eager to find out something about the 
nature of the relation between freedom and development in a so-
called transition economy. For the first time in my university career 
I am trying to open the purely conceptual perspective on an issue to 
the rough ground of empirical facts, deeply convinced that only 
these facts can give meaning to any conceptual framework. 
The framework I am going to use and to fill with facts is a net 
woven around two cornerstones: Freedom and Development. In the 
following I aim to fill some gaps in this network, very aware of the 
fact that I will not establish a complete system. If I should be 
successful in contributing towards the understanding of the concept 
of freedom, of the role that freedom plays for development and in 
encouraging some discussion, I would be rather pleased. 
Setting the Stage 
When you start talking about the Ukraine, most people in Western 
Europe or even further afield will be hard-pressed to add something 
profound to the conversation. Although situated right between 
central Europe and Russia and thus of strategic importance, the 
country remains virtually unknown throughout most of the world. 
This relative ignorance was only interrupted in 1986, the year when 
the Chemobyl accident shattered our confidence in nuclear power. 
"Ukraina" means borderland, and indeed for much of the last 
millennium the Ukraine has been a frontier zone remaining at the 
intersection of the continually shifting borders of the Grand Duchy 
ofLithunia, the Ottoman Empire, the Polish-Lithunian 
Commonwealth, the Crimean Tatar Khanate and Muscovy. The 
different parts of the area have belonged to a range of different 
peoples and countries. 
An exception to the status of a politically undefined territory was 
the so-called "Golden Age" of the Kievan Rus. It lasted from the 
early tenth to mid-thirteenth century. Under Yaroslaw the Wise 
(1036-1054) laws were codified and a stable administration was 
established. Thus Kiev grew to be a political, economical and 
cultural centre that was able to compete with Constantinople. 
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Yaroslav strengthened the state's ties with Europe by marrying his 
daughters to the kings of France, Hungary and Norway. 
Unfortunately, the glory could not be maintained- and never really 
returned. The Mongols under Tshingis Khan took over in mid-
thirteenth century. The area around Kiev and the north and the 
south of the empire become tributary to the Mongols, while the 
principalities ofNowgorod and Polotzk remained relatively 
independent. This division explains the different political, cultural 
and religious developments ofboth the Mongolian and the more 
western orientated parts of the previous Kiev an empire in the 
middle ages. These differences remain significant until today. 
After two and a half centuries of Mongolian oppression the chain 
of different rulers continues for centuries afterwards: Lithunians, 
Poles, Austrian-Hungarians -and last but not least- the Russians. 
It is not the purpose of this work to give a detailed historical 
overview, but whoever is interested in the Ukraine will find it 
worthwhile to put some time into researching the different 
historical periods. 
All these peoples and systems left their marks - some more, some 
less. In cities such as Lviv one clearly recognises the Western 
European influence. A certain Viennese flair has resisted even 70 
years of SU totalitarianism. On the other hand, the further east one 
ventures, the more one feels the closeness to Russia. Greek 
Catholic Unitate Churches give way to Russian Orthodox ones. 
You can trust your nose: the further east you go, the more incense 
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is used as a haze for the senses. If one were a bit sarcastic, one 
might claim that people further east would need additional portions 
of incense. The well-known and often abused Marx-insight that 
religion is the opium for the people, makes perfect sense under 
these conditions: the quality of roads and infrastructure in general 
and the degree of hope in people's minds seem to decrease with 
every city one passes. More and more road blocks emerge and you 
get used to having to bribe your way for you and your vehicle past 
"police men", who seemingly have taken the current call for 
privatisation a bit too seriously and work independently of state and 
law. You see potato fields protected by ex-soldiers who lean on 
their rifles. Thus, nobody really minds an extra-portion of incense 
as a means of comfort- indeed, that's by far preferable to the 
common place alcoholism terrorising society! 
Admittedly, these last remarks must sound somewhat sarcastic to 
the reader. Of course, th~y are meant rather to be snapshots and do 
not claim any scientific validity- but they might help the reader to 
get in touch with the atmosphere one can experience while 
travelling the Ukraine. 
However, there is more to the country than Chemobyl, alcoholism 
and corruption. Post-independence Ukraine has a chance. It is a 
country of impressive physical size, economic potential, resource 
endowment and great people. And even if the country might not 
return to the glory of the Kievan Rus- the days of"Golden Ages" 
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seem to be over anyway- its people can change it into a country 
where they can lead free and responsible lives according to their 
values. That's not going to be an easy path- but one worth 
travelling. 
By far the most inspiring theoretical input for this project is 
Amartya Sen's book "Development as Freedom". His analysis of 
the concept of freedom and the relation between freedom and 
development is the departure point for my considerations. 
Moreover, I found the work ofF.A. Hayek (The Constitution of 
Liberty), Hernando DeSoto (The Mystery of Capital) and Jon 
Elster (The Cement of Society) to be outstandingly instructive. 
Furthermore and most importantly, I am very grateful for all the 
material concerning recent developments in the agricultural sector 
of the Ukraine that I received from the Department of Agricultural 
Economics of the University ofGottingen (Germany). In particular, 
I am grateful to Ludwig Striewe, one of the Department's Research 
Associates 1, whose patience in answering many of my questions 
regularly left me with amazement. Without this support the 
informational base of this work would have been much poorer. 
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A. Exposition-The Theoretical Framework 
Free Agency 
"The argument for liberty is not an argument against 
organization, which is one of the most powe1ful means that human 
reason can employ, but an argument against all exclusive, 
privileged, monopolistic organization, against the use of coercion 
to prevent others from trying to do better "2 
Discussions on freedom often tum out to be rather puzzling. When 
I asked Natali a, our translator in the Ukraine, about the acquired 
freedom in her country, she just smiled mildly at me and said, 
"there is no freedom, only many sorts ofunfreedom". After the first 
euphoria had passed, people saw themselves confronted with a high 
degree of uncertainty in most areas of social life. The country had 
gained independence from Soviet rule, but it was far from clear 
where this freedom would lead. 
When we talk about free agency we seem to find ourselves in some 
kind of a paradox. On the one hand, freedom seems to presuppose a 
systematic relation between our expectations concerning the 
outcomes of our actions and the outcomes themselves. This in tum 
is only possible with a reliable level of information and certainty 
about the environment within which we act and interact, 
comprising both our physical and societal surroundings. That is 
why free action presupposes certain constraints such as rules and 
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norms that structure our behaviour and help us to rationalise the 
world.3 
On the other hand, we would be reluctant to call a scenario of 
perfect information facilitated by an exceedingly high level of 
regulation the right playground for free agency. Understandably, 
under such circumstances our expectations would always match 
with the outcomes of our "actions". But would this kind of 
"agency" be valuable to us? 
What would be the point of playing the game of life when the 
outcome is clear right from the beginning? Where would 
development and progress fit into such a picture? The whole novel 
of one's life would have been written before one were to start with 
it. Thus, the state of affairs where everything is regulated, where 
everything is perfectly certain, is not what is needed for free action. 
Finally, we are also not looking for some kind of metaphysical 
freedom a la Hegel that would be characterised by complete 
certainty and the absence of any constraints from others. 
We are looking for psychologically significant freedom; a kind of 
freedom the individual can experience and that allows her to invent 
herself within certain boundaries. These boundaries are real but not 
unchangeable. Since the context of individual freedom is society, 
the constraints I am focusing on are constraints resulting from the 
presence and activity of other people in society rather than natural 
forces. Thus I am concerned merely with constraints that fall into 
the category of regulation and state coercion. These constraints 
include both the formal legal framework under which a society 
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operates, such as the rule of law and the social norms and values, 
which support this formal framework. So where is the appropriate 
space for freedom then? 
I would suggest the following ways of thinking about the matter. 
Firstly, we can picture an increasing level of certainty on the x-axis 
and a decreasing degree of constraints from others on the y-axis of 
a Cartesian system. If we divide both axes into ten equal segments 
(0-10) respectively, we can say the following: Neither the point 
described by the co-ordinates (x=O; y=O) nor the point described by 
the co-ordinates {x=10; y=10) would satisfy the conditions for 
psychologically significant freedom. The former would describe a 
scenario of severe uncertainty and an extreme degree of constraints 
from others. The latter describes the kind of Hegelian metaphysical 
freedom characterised by perfect information and the absence of 
any constraints from others. 
Secondly, we can change the designation of the axes as follows: an 
increasing level of certainty remains depicted on the x-axis and 
increasing degree of constraints from others is now depicted on the 
y-axis. The segmentation of the receptive axes remains the same. 
Again, neither the point described by the co-ordinates {x=O; y=O) 
nor the point described by the co-ordinates {x= 1 0; y= 1 0) fulfils the 
conditions for psychologically significant freedom: {x=O; y=O) 
describes an anarchic scenario characterised by severe uncertainty 
and absence of constraints from others and {x= 1 0; y= 1 0) describes 
a quasi-deterministic scenario of perfect information and an 
extreme degree of constraints from others. 
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Note that these scenarios do not describe real states of the world. 
They help us rather to think about reality. 
What I am assuming is that different degrees of psychologically 
significant freedom can be found in an area between these 
extremes; I am not claiming that we can locate this kind of freedom 
at a single fixed spot in the system. 
From these remarks one can already draw two conclusions: 
a) Freedom and free agency must neither be confused with the 
absence of rules/constraints or with complete regulation. 
b) Freedom is not unidimensional; it makes sense to talk about 
different degrees of freedom or about a variety of possible 
equilibria. 
The social constraints that psychologically significant freedom and 
free agency presuppose, I would like to call institutions.4 
Institutions can be seen as the rules of the game of social life. 
In the broad sense they build the informational basis for any 
rational action by providing agents with a sufficient level of 
information about their environment. Only when I know that 
certain rules prevail for all players in the game can I, at least to an 
acceptable extent, predict the outcomes of people's actions. Only 
when I can be fairly certain that other people adhere to certain 
societal norms, that prevent them from defecting, will I enter into 
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co-operation with them without having to guard too extensively 
against their likely opportunistic behaviour. 
Viewed from a slightly different angle, one could say that 
institutions prevent negative externalities caused by one agent from 
infringing on the freedoms another agent enjoys. 
This explanation of institutions can well be made in terms of pareto 
optimality. From a certain point onward, any additional unit of 
freedom utilised by one agent might subtract from the freedom 
another agent can enjoy. When one accepts that interpersonal utility 
comparisons are difficult, then the problem of optimising freedom 
within society can only be solved by negotiation. This also implies 
that freedom rather demands than denies the necessity of co-
operation and the ability to compromise. 
However, the institutional network that on the one hand helps us to 
rationalise our environment and to plan our actions, and on the 
other hand prevents the negative externalities caused by one agent 
from restricting the free agency of another agent, is not made of 
iron. Although we are acting within a given institutional 
framework, this framework leaves us space and even provides us 
with the very opportunity to make choices and to influence and 
change the institutional infrastructure in accordance with our 
current conception of a fair society. Thus it is not only the 
institutional web of formal and informal rules that shape the 
behaviour of agents within society, but also the choices agents 
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make and the actions they perform that can and do shape the 
institutional constraints of any society. 
As Hayek puts it for the matter of state interference in human life: 
"Organization is{. . .} likely to be beneficial and effective so long 
as it is voluntary and is embedded in a free sphere and will either 
have to adjust itself to circumstances not taken into account in its 
conception or fail "5 
What is important for social integration and stability, I presume, is 
that the members of the respective society accept and recognise 
these rules as fair, that they consider them to be legitimate. That is 
probably most obvious when it comes to formal property and 
contract rights. For this acceptance to prevail, it is crucial that 
formal regulations and informal arrangements, and in a similar 
manner one set of formal rules and another one, do not contradict 
each other. 
Furthermore, arbitrary regulation, including both over-regulation 
and under-regulation, is the perfect breeding ground for all sorts of 
opportunistic behaviour that undermines co-operative equilibria in 
society and makes it less free. The opaqueness and non-
transparency of arbitrary regulation, e.g. the frequent and 
retroactive change of rules, cause a high level ofuncertainty and 
distrust in society that prevents free agency and development. 
II 
In the course of this thesis I am going to illustrate these rather 
abstract remarks by describing some of the recent developments 
and policies in the Ukraine and especially in the agricultural sector 
of the country. For this transition country it is of vital importance to 
get onto an equilibrium path that is characterised by the rule oflaw. 
· It must wind its way between both over- and under-regulation, to 
create a stable but non-coercive framework that allows its citizens 
to act as free agents. Setting the issue of freedom and development 
in a context where institutional arrangements are still highly fragile 
will hopefully open our eyes to the significance of a well-
established institutional environment that enhances people's 
personal freedoms and contributes to the development and growth 
of a country. 
Amartya Sen argues in Development as Freedom for the need for 
an integrated analysis of economic, social and political freedoms 
and the various interconnections among them that enable every 
member of the respective society to lead a life she has reason to 
value. 6 At the same time he views development as an integrated 
process of expansion of these interconnecting freedoms. 
"Societal arrangements, involving many institutions (the state, the 
market, the legal system, political parties, the media, public 
interest groups and public discussion fontms, [ ... ]) are investigated 
in terms of their contribution to enhancing and guaranteeing the 
substantive freedoms of individuals, seen as active agents of 
change[ ... } "(p. xiii) 
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In the following section I shall review Sen's capabilities approach 
in some detail. 
Sen's Capabilities Approach 
Development economics has often been accused of focusing 
exclusively on the role of markets and the generation of wealth 
with reliance on income as the prime indicator, using only the 
traditional measuring devices of GNP or GDP, economic growth 
and cost benefit analysis and often ignoring wider social and 
political factors. 
In all his considerations Amartya Sen does not contest the 
importance of markets and material wealth creation. Instead he tries 
to establish a different perspective on development in which 
political freedoms (free speech, a free press and free elections) help 
to promote economic security, social opportunities (education, 
equal status of women, etc.) facilitate economic participation and 
economic facilities help to generate personal abundance as well as 
public resources for social activities. 
Sen's capabilities approach "measures" development by the extent 
to which a range of diverse human capabilities or freedoms are 
realised. The freedoms individuals enjoy are both treated as the 
basic building blocks of development and as the appropriate 
elements of optimisation that constitute the idea of development 
itself. 
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According to Sen development is the process of expanding the real 
freedoms or capabilities that people enjoy so that they can choose a 
life they have reason to value. It requires the removal of major 
sources of unfreedom such as poverty, neglect of public facilities, 
intolerance and over-activity of a repressive state, etc. 
It is crucial for Sen's argument that freedom entails not only the 
processes that allow freedom of actions and decisions but also the 
actual opportunities that people have, given their personal and 
social circumstances. Both components are essential parts of the 
definition of freedom. 
Freedom is at once the goal of development and the principal 
means of development. This interdependency between freedom and 
development implies for Sen firstly that the assessment of 
development has to be done in terms of whether the freedoms that 
people enjoy are enhanced, and secondly, that development is 
thoroughly dependent on the free agency of people. 7 For 
development to take place social institutions must aim at expanding 
individual freedoms. But simultaneously, individual freedoms must 
be used to improve the standard of life and to make social 
arrangements more effective. 
Thus individual freedom is viewed as a social product and the 
success of society is evaluated by the substantive freedoms that its 
14 
members enjoy. Freedom enables people to help themselves and to 
influence the world. Thus it is both the necessary and sufficient 
condition for individual responsibility. 
The concept of informed choice is central to Sen's approach. The 
capabilities approach focuses on the creation of conditions that 
provide people with real opportunities (capabilities) to judge the 
kind of lives they would like to lead and that allow them to choose 
between alternative functioning combinations or different life-
styles. Substantive public support in the provision ofbasic health 
care and essential education is crucial in that respect, but so are 
basic political and civil rights that prevail under democracy, 
including the opportunity of open public discussion and debate. 
The latter are not only among the basic human freedoms and thus 
important in themselves, but they also play an instrumental role in 
enhancing the hearing that people attain in expressing their claims 
to political attention. Furthermore, they are crucial for the 
conceptualisation of economic needs and the formation of shared 
values and preferences. 
Public consensus on certain values and rules of conduct is essential 
for sustainable development. These informal institutions are 
desperately needed to supplement formal institutions such as the 
market. They may be strengthened by ethical consideration but they 
are also instrumentally important for economic and political 
success. Trust and responsibility are necessary ingredients for the 
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long-term sustainability and success of any economic and political 
system. 
Instrumental Freedoms 
The emphasis in Sen's capability approach to freedom is on the 
development of the responsible agent, capable of changing her 
environment and able to help herself and others. Sen lists five 
instrumental freedoms that essentially contribute to the general 
capability of the individual to act and choose freely: 
1) Political freedoms 
2) Economic facilities 
3) Social opportunities 
4) Transparency guarantees 
5) Protective security 
Political freedoms include civil rights. They provide people with 
the opportunity to determine who is going to govern them and on 
what principles. They provide citizens with the right to scrutinise 
and criticise authorities and are intimately linked to the freedom of 
political expression, association and participation and the freedom 
of the press. 
Under economic facilities Sen subsumes the opportunities citizens 
have to utilise economic resources for the purpose of consumption, 
production or exchange. Economic entitlements depend on the 
resources owned by the individual or available to her, on the 
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conditions of exchange, relative prices and the working of the 
market. Another important aspect with respect to economic 
entitlements is the availability and access to finance. 
Social opportunities include the arrangements society makes for the 
availability of basic public goods like health care, education and 
housing. These opportunities enable citizens to participate both in 
economic and political activities. 
Transparency guarantees are important due to the agents' need for 
openness and certainty. They are expected to enhance the 
predictability of people's actions, thereby facilitating all kinds of 
social and economic interaction and co-operation. Transparency 
guarantees are a basic means to create trust and they work as a 
disincentive for corruption and other forms of opportunistic 
behaviour. 
By protective security Sen means the establishment of a 
functioning social safety net, which should include certain fixed 
institutional arrangements like unemployment benefits and 
obligatory insurance schemes. 
Each set of these freedoms is important in itself. For example, we 
do not need to justify the significance of civil rights by referring to 
their positive impact on the development of the market or 
individual prosperity; they are valuable in themselves. So even if a 
person would not suffer from any economic disadvantage we 
would still find that a lack of political rights subtracts substantially 
from her overall freedom to choose a life she has reason to value. 
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Equally, economic freedom is a goal in its own right. The denial of 
opportunities of transaction, through arbitrary controls for instance, 
is a source ofunfreedom in itself independently of the fact that 
arbitrary restrictions of the market reduce people's real 
opportunities in other areas. 
Nevertheless, all these instrumental freedoms reinforce each other, 
and improvements in one area will often lead to improvements in 
other areas. For example, the provision of basic education will help 
people both to stand up for their political rights and to participate in 
e.conomic activities. A telling example, which Sen provides us 
with, is that of an enhanced level of literacy and education of 
young women in developing countries, such as India, which 
contributes essentially to the decrease of birth rates in these 
regions. This helps to deal both with the problem of overpopulation 
and the improvement of women's health in underdeveloped areas, 
enabling these women to take their stand in society. 
The Practicality of Sen's Approach 
However intuitively appealing this approach may be, it is necessary 
to point out some reservations concerning the workability of Sen's 
concept ofhuman flourishing and development. I agree that his 
approach provides us with a much broader view on development 
than narrower, income-focused, measurement approaches do and 
that it has great analytical power. But how far can this broader 
concept be applied practically? 
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Sen admits that there is no way of attaching a specific weight to 
each capability. It is impossible to say that education is worth x, 
economic security y, and a free press z. There is no simple formula 
for measuring development. That implies that the capabilities 
approach is more difficult to apply than the narrower income-
focused approaches it is intended to extend. 
However, this does not mean that it is impractical. Although it 
might be hard to record Sen's concept of development in a 
quantitative way and equally hard to evaluate the trade-offs 
between the various development goals8, they can provide clear 
criteria for development policies, which can complement more 
quantitative economic indicators. 
Reaching consensus about the priorities of certain goals might be 
thought of as problematic as well, but I suppose that this is not an 
unmanageable task as long as one does not lose track of the broader 
picture. Some options will always be more feasible to pursue now 
than others will. Government investment in health care and basic 
education, for instance, is not very costly in many developing 
countries due to low labour costs and can therefore be initiated 
even before economic growth kicks in. The development of these 
sectors is going to improve people's standard oflife and is likely to 
have a positive impact on other development goals. 
However, the main problem is the following: if we agree that we 
have to take into account many dimensions when it comes to 
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measuring the quality of development policies, one could object 
that governments would then have opportunities to fudge about 
important issues. Government officials could always claim to act in 
the interest of this or that "development aspect", preventing its 
citizens and foreign countries from holding it accountable to clear 
and comprehensive standards. The more complex the targets of 
political action are, the more complicated and obscure the policies 
that can evolve. If they did, transparency would be threatened and 
that in tum opens the door (or keeps it open) for all kinds of 
irresponsible behaviour. 
The non-transparency that might arise with the attempt to maximise 
a complex development function, is likely to incentivate the 
different bureaucrats concerned with different development 
objectives to misuse their discretionary powers. Sen does not tell us 
who would be responsible for constraining this administrative 
discretion. He points out that under the institutional infrastructure 
of instrumental freedoms development standards cannot simply be 
invented as it suits certain governmental or non-governmental 
interest groups. They have to be formed by democratic debate. 
People arguing about them are expected to create clear standards of 
behaviour and social values. (Of course, a basic set of common 
beliefs and the willingness to debate are needed for any 
conversation or discussion to start.) 
However, we must not be over-optimistic. It is not clear whether 
democratic debate and public discussion will always lead to 
consistent standards. Certain interests within society are simply 
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opposed to each other. The mobility of capital, for instance, is 
hardly reconcilable with concerns about equality and certain 
efficiency measures might contradict other social issues. 
Democratic debate alone does not innoculate society against rent-
seeking and other forms of power abuse. 
Thus, one might argue that a narrower optimisation focus could 
provide stricter and more consistent standards to which a 
government or state can be held accountable. But despite the 
reservations I have made above, development goals such as the 
establishment of legal certainty, an efficient social safety network, 
an independent and diverse media and the supply of educational 
facilities are important and can, under certain conditions, be 
pursued without sliding into non-transparency and opportunism. 
Sen does point out that government officials must be accountable to 
their citizens and citizens must remain vigilant and exercise their 
rights of free expression and political participation. However- as 
mentioned already - this is not sufficient. There also needs to be 
some general constraint on the discretionary powers of government 
officials. It is a severe weakness of Sen's approach that he does not 
address this concern sufficiently. 
Hayek's Constitution of Liberty 
F.A. Hayek has given one of the most comprehensive accounts of 
liberalism in The Constitution of Liberty. In his work Hayek 
defends the chief values of classical liberalism such as the dignity 
of the human individual, the moral primacy of her freedom, the 
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benefits of free markets and the necessity oflimited government 
under the rule of law. 
Hayek defines liberty as the independence of the arbitrary will of 
another or the absence of coercion by other men. Coercion is 
characterised as eliminating an individual as a thinking and valuing 
person and making her a bare tool in the achievement of the ends of 
another person. 
The main argument in Hayek's account ofliberty is that a free 
society must be governed by the rule of law. Here it necessary to 
point out what he means by the role of law. 
"The role of law is [ ... ] not a role of the law, but a role concerning 
what the law ought to be, a metaphysical doctrine or a political 
ideal. "9 It is something like a meta-constitutional doctrine about 
what an actual constitution ought to be. 
The rule of law is characterised by three essential attributes. 10 
Firstly, its rules must be general and abstract. Laws should be long-
term measures that refer to yet unknown cases, never to particular 
persons, places or objects. They must be prospective rather than 
retrospective in their outlook. 
Secondly, the rules of the law must be known and certain. There 
must exist a set of judicial procedures, such that decisions of 
courts, which articulate these laws, become predictable. 
Finally, the rules of the law must respect individual equality before 
the law. 
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On page 154 of The Constitution of Liberty Hayek gives a truly 
beautiful characterisation of the rule oflaw: "The tnte contrast to a 
reign of status is the reign of general and equal laws, of the rules 
which are the same for all, or, we might say, of the ntle of leges, 
in the original meaning of the Latin word for laws -leges that is, 
as opposed to the privi-leges" 
The "rule of status", which Hayek opposes would be a state in 
which the rules are not fully general but single out particular 
persons or groups and confer upon them special rights or duties. 
His characterisation of the rule of law implies that rules must apply 
to those who lay them down and those who apply them- to both 
the government and to the governed, independent of their position 
- and that nobody has the right or power to grant exemptions. 
For all these demands to be fulfilled the law must have largely 
formal character, stipulating terms under which people pursue their 
chosen activities. 
One of Hayek's basic premises is the limitation ofhuman reason. 
The individual lives in a complicated world of change and 
uncertainty, in which complete foresight is a matter of 
impossibility. The abstract and general rules of the law (as well as 
the rules of nature) help to restrict the scope of this uncertainty and 
only through the knowledge of these rules is the individual able to 
predict the consequences of her actions and to make plans with 
confidence. That is the precondition for free agency. The rules of 
the law provide the framework within which the individual can 
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confidently calculate risk. The law defines variable side constraints, 
which both constitute individual freedom and draw its boundaries. 
These side constraints or rights identify protected domains by 
imposing limits on all individual action. The definition of property, 
for instance, is one of the crucial achievements of the law and 
essential for the functioning of a market economy. It frames the 
protected domain of each individual - a domain that is respected by 
her fellow citizens (and the government!) and in which decisions 
and choices are hers. The recognition of private property is 
considered to be an essential condition for the prevention of 
coercion. Moreover, it provides individuals with the necessary 
knowledge about who owns what. Without that kind of knowledge 
the benefits of co-operation would be less clear and thus co-
operation would be less likely to occur. Thus the stable juridical 
framework of liberty under the rule of law provides people with the 
greatest opportunity to make voluntary exchanges that are to their 
mutual benefit. 
In accordance with his theory of spontaneous formation of order in 
society, Hayek formulates the task of the lawgiver as the creation 
of conditions in which an orderly arrangement can evolve and ever 
renew itself. This idea of the "evolution" of order and rules restricts 
the possibility of designing social institutions considerably. 
All these ideas convey Hayek's theory of procedural justice. In his 
view rules of justice guide individuals by defining the range of 
permissible actions and making her environment more predictable. 
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Justice is the means of securing social co-operation and is not 
directly concerned with the question of distribution. In a free and 
just society all major institutions, aside from those bound up with 
sustaining its framework, should be privatised. There would be 
competing types of education, welfare provision, medical care, etc. 
Thus coercion by a monopoly supplier of such services would be 
less likely and their effectiveness would be significantly increased. 
The framework that is established by the rule of law is the 
precondition for the attainment of general welfare- if we conceive 
of welfare in terms of maximising the chances of an unknown 
individual to achieve her ends. These ends need to be discovered. 
Procedural justice rather than justice of substantive outcomes is 
meant to give individuals the maximum opportunities to obtain 
their unknown purposes within certain defined boundaries. 
Progress is only possible if individuals are free to experiment and 
to learn. Liberty under the rule of law is the necessary and 
sufficient condition for progress. Hayek speaks about the "process 
of formation and modification of the human intellect, the process of 
adaptation and learning in which not only the possibilities known 
to us but also our values and desires continually change". 11 
Some critical remarks 
Hayek's approach has often been criticised because it does not 
provide a more substantive view on justice and rights. The Kantian 
requirements of abstraction and generality, which he applies to law, 
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are not recognised as a sufficient condition for a liberal legal 
framework and often not even as a necessary condition for a stable 
and predictable legal code by many. His critics point out that he 
inadequately specifies individual rights in almost entirely 
procedural terms. Hayek is accused ofhaving conflated individual 
freedom with the rule of law while ignoring the demand for 
substantive freedoms and rights. 
In order to understand Hayek's reluctance to specify substantive 
freedoms and rights further, we have to consider his social theory 
and his ideas about knowledge. For Hayek rules of the law (and 
therefore rules of justice) embody not only explicit laws but also an 
enormous amount of social knowledge: they entail what is 
considered to be a duty in the respective society, they express 
social norms, values and conventions that have been agreed upon. 
Note that this kind of knowledge is for the greatest part not 
articulated. It is embodied in action. Consent on norms and values 
does not need to be reached by any kind of verbal debate or 
discussion. It often arises when individuals adopt or reject certain 
practices according to their observations of success and failure. 
The reason for Hayek's reluctance to specify too many rules of 
justice originates from this epistemology. A great deal of our social 
knowledge cannot be articulated but must remain in procedures, 
which express it. What we regard as just today can differ widely 
from what we considered just a while ago. 
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In Hayek's approach the rule of law provides individuals with the 
framework within which they can act independently of the arbitrary 
will of another agent. Agents have a right to take action that is not 
"forbidden" by one of the abstract and general rules created by the 
rule of law. Hayek applies the Kantian test ofuniversalisability to 
the rules of the law. This test includes the demand for consistency 
between similar cases and non-discrimination and the demand for 
impartiality between different agents. The maxims that meet these 
demands must be integrated into a system of non-conflicting rules. 
But then Hayek goes on to combine this Kantian and obviously 
reason-based approach with his idea of the spontaneous order of 
society. Individuals act within their "self-imposed" constraints as 
long as the latter are successful in co-ordinating interaction and 
facilitating co-operation. When they fail to meet these objectives 
due to a change in circumstances, they will be supplanted by new 
rules. But would that be a deliberative or an evolutionary process or 
a combination of both? Will the new rules pass the test of 
universalisability? And if they did, would that be a sufficient 
condition for liberty? Admittedly this combination of ideas is 
somewhat confusing. 
The evolutionary view on the establishment and change of the 
social contract does not have to build on moral arguments, but it 
does not exclude them either. Moral principles and rights are bound 
to change, but of course that should not prevent us from moral 
reasoning and the formulation and implementation of rights. 
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Here I agree with Sen that in studying evolutionary selection within 
a broad framework, there is no need to confine the admission of 
norms and values to evolutionary selection without allowing a role 
for rational deliberation. Evolutionary selection does not exclude 
rational deliberation. 
Hayek is rather sceptical about the roles that public discourse can 
play in society. He points to the fact that the political process often 
strongly favours existing, powerful and well-entrenched groups, 
which are able to use the arena of public discourse to defend their 
interests more effectively than groups that lack such skills and 
resources. Rather than focusing on opportunities that would allow 
the latter to increase their bargaining power, he denies the 
beneficial role that political participation and public discourse can 
play in the formulation of norms, values and political programmes. 
Furthermore, he does not seem to see that these processes do not 
contradict the fact that the long-run survival of norms and values 
can scarcely be independent of their consequences and the selection 
processes that may come into play. This reluctance is all the more 
striking in view of his risky attempt to combine his evolutionary 
account of the processes in society with the rather rationalist test of 
universalisability to the rules of the law. 
Hayek's conception of the limited role of human reasoning and its 
deliberate influence on society at times seems to suggest that all 
deliberative attempts to reform society are in vain. However, 
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despite the importance of being aware of the difficulties that will 
arise when we try to reform society and of the time consuming and 
gradual character of the process, this does not mean that reform is 
impossible or undesirable. For any successful reform attempt clear 
development criteria need to be formulated, criteria to which policy 
makers can be held accountable. Neither the appeal to evolution 
nor to some metaphysical ideal will be very helpful. That is all the 
more obvious when we tum our attention from the stable 
democracies of the West to developments of transition countries in 
the East. 
However, if we compare Hayek's work to Sen, his approach has at 
least one significant advantage. Sen puts enormous trust in the 
powers of democratic debate and the reinforcement of instrumental 
freedoms to ensure a free society. Yet - as pointed out before - this 
optimism does not seem to be justified. Different groups in society 
care about different things to different extents. Conflicts of interest 
are inevitable and a consensus cannot always be reached. In some 
cases distortive outcomes seem to be unavoidable. So what is going 
to restrain the consequences of either of the interest groups winning 
to the detriment of the freedom of other agents? 
Furthermore, who can guarantee that government officials and . 
bureaucrats, while claiming to act in the interest of the population, 
do not abuse their discretionary powers? Who guarantees the just 
implementation of developmental objectives? 
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Hayek can be accused of paying insufficient attention to the role of 
democratic debate and the formulation of norms and values. But he 
clearly designates the rule oflaw as the fundamental principle that 
all interest groups in society must respect. He is opposed to all 
forms of creeping administrative discretion that threaten liberty. He 
is not only against central planning itself but also against the kind 
of accidental socialism characterised by too much bureaucratic 
discretion and non-transparency, which can surface everywhere 
when people forget to be vigilant. The rule of law is meant to 
provide a constraint on such discretionary powers and arbitrary 
coercion. Thus it needs to be embodied in the institutional 
framework of any free society. This is going to be ofutmost 
importance in the Ukrainian context. 
Interlude 
Dealing with freedom and development, the necessity of 
transparent regulation, trust and responsibility creation and the 
importance of political and economic competition are going to play 
a major role in this work. The negative effects that a lack of 
transparency, trust, responsibility and competition among economic 
agents has, will be made apparent by giving several examples of 
opportunistic behaviour (rent-seeking, asset-stripping, moral 
hazard, etc.) as they occur in the Ukraine, which subtract 
substantially from the overall freedom of society and its 
developmental potential. 
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In trying to pull the different components that are decisive for 
substantive freedom and sustainable development together, I will 
have recourse to some insights made by the advocates of the New 
Institutional Economics. I am going to focus on problems such as 
information asymmetry, transaction costs and the principal-agent 
model. In relation to these issues I will also deal with the role of 
such fundamental institutions as a well-established formal property 
system and enforceable contract rights. Furthermore, I will try to 
give some indication of the significance of informal institutions 
over which policy makers have less influence (e.g. social norms 
and values) and the need to integrate them with formal rules. 
Finally, I am going to discuss the role that international lending 
institutions and other foreign donors can play for progress in 
transition. 
In my considerations I will emphasise the importance of economic 
development and economic growth. In doing so, I am treating these 
aspects of development predominantly as a means for enhancing 
the standard of living people enjoy and their capability to choose a 
life according to their values and perception of the good, and less 
as ends in themselves. 
31 
B. Development 
Ukraine as a Rent-Seeking Society 
In order to sketch an impression of the Ukrainian economy's 
situation after independence in I99I, I would like to provide the 
reader with a couple of telling figures. 
On the Index of economic Freedom established by the Fraser 
Institute, Ukraine reserves place I 06 out of II4 countries in 1997 
(Russia: 1 02). 
The Index of economic Freedom of the Heritage Foundation ranks 
Ukraine on position I24 out of I61 countries in 1999 (Russia: I 06). 
Transparency International put the country in position 87 (together 
with Azerbaijan) in its September 2000 report (ranking from 1 = 
least corrupt: Finland, to 90 =most corrupt: Nigeria) 
Last, but not least, in the report on competitiveness issued by the 
World Economic Forum in Geneva on 7 September 2000, Ukraine, 
Bulgaria, Zimbabwe and the Russian Federation tied for place 58 
out of 59 places. 
I take it to be a fact that non-competitiveness is a major obstacle to 
freedom, facilitating opportunistic behaviour like rent-seeking and 
corruption. Certain influential groups pursuing their own narrow 
vested interests have an incentive to prevent free competition in 
order to extract as many rents as possible for themselves from the 
state. Given that state resources are limited this rent-seeking 
32 
behaviour subtracts from the welfare of the majority of the 
population and has a negative impact on the development of the 
respective country. Moreover, rent-seeking typically produces 
horrendous inefficiencies in the use of assets even when managers 
are unsuccessful in stealing or asset-stripping. 
If, on the other hand, free competition is allowed, then the various 
interests within society can compete, compromises can be reached 
informed by public discussion, which in turn is essential for the 
creation and maintenance of common norms and values. The latter 
are the informal institutions, without which the bare net of formal 
regulation would collapse. Under such conditions, which should 
prevail under democracy, narrow vested interests are less likely to 
survive for long. 
Anders Aslund describes the Ukraine in his 1999 paper "Why has 
Ukraine failed to achieve economic growth?" as a full-fledged rent-
seeking society, which is construed to benefit a small elite, living 
off monopoly rents that are costly to society at large. The economy 
is characterised by an amalgam of dominant insider ownership 
combined with a lack of enterprise restructuring, slow deregulation 
and ubiquitous and arbitrary state intervention. The state 
administration is extensive and intrusive; incoherent decision 
making renders legislation unstable and causes a huge amount of 
uncertainty and distrust among economic agents. In the Ukraine the 
old elite remained powerful in the sense that it managed to use its 
influence over politics to gain material benefit. The continuous 
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development of new and often arbitrary regulation by the 
government helped them to maintain control and to maximise their 
rents consisting mainly of state subsidies and monopoly rents. 
Therefore, in the first years after independence deregulation in the 
Ukraine was very slow and incomplete. Economic and bureaucratic 
agents profited from informal property rights acquired in the past. 
They steered the institutional change of the administrative market 
in a direction that secured and formalised their privileges and 
simultaneously prevented external competition. Agents had the 
bargaining power necessary to enforce only partial reforms because 
they were still effectively organised via the old networks 
established under communism and because the newly developed 
democratic state was still weak. Due to this networking, 
government and business were living in mutual dependence. 
Businessmen were often in favour of all kinds of regulations 
applying to others but not to themselves 12 (including high taxes) 
that would increase their monopoly rents. In order to be re-elected, 
politicians would need the support of top-businessmen, but 
politicians could also oust the tycoons if they turned against 
political leaders. Members of government were earning a 
significant part of their revenues from bribes and were 
consequently opposed to any deregulation. 13 Parliament had the 
dominant tendency to pass numerous laws on tax exemptions and 
additional regulations, while major draft reform laws were 
postponed for years. 
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In a nutshell, government, parliament and businessmen were all 
promoting a maximum of regulation and state interference in order 
to maximise their rents. The population was of little consequence 
since it was partly co-opted and compromised by the rent-seeking 
system as well. Many people were and remain unable to stand up 
for their rights due to the poor economic situation, the dependence 
on the underground economy, the lack of social security, and 
reasonable distrust in political institutions. 
Rent-Seeking behaviour has taken different forms, depending on 
changing circumstances. In 1993 and 1994 four forms of rent-
seeking were predominant: 
1) Due to persistent price regulation it was quite convenient to 
buy cheap metals and chemicals in the Ukraine and sell them 
abroad at world market prices. For this to work, access to 
metals and export permits were required. In 1992 the total 
export rent gained in such a way amounted to $ 4.1 billion or 
20 per cent ofGDP. 
2) Another strategy employed was the import of certain 
commodities such as natural gas from Russia, at a low 
subsidised exchange rate in order to resell it at a higher price. 
The rents obtained increased, if one simply would not pay for 
the deliveries and let the government pay on the basis of state 
guarantees for gas imports. 
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3) Most famously, subsidised credits were an important 
breeding ground for rent-seeking. In 1993 Ukraine struggled 
with a 10,155 per cent inflation rate. However, huge state 
credits were issued at an interest rate of 20 per cent and, thus 
essentially represented gifts to those who could quickly 
convert them into hard currency or tradable commodities. 
4) Finally, budget subsidies amounted to 8.1 per cent ofGDP in 
1992 and 10.8 per cent ofGDP in 1993. These subsidies were 
concentrated on agriculture and the energy sector. The 
distortions caused by state subsidies to the agricultural sector 
will be discussed later. 
On the whole, a small rent-seeking insider elite usurped a huge 
share of GDP in the early years of transition and thereby became 
even more powerful. As rent-seeking interests became entrenched, 
market oriented reforms became less and less likely. The only 
significant threat to this remarkably stable rent-seeking system was 
that of the collapse caused by macroeconomic instability. 
Some time later, notably in 1996 macroeconomic stabilisation was 
taking hold and inflationary rents were largely abolished. 14 
However, structural reforms were not pursued over this period. 
Consequently, macro-economic stabilisation remained fragile and 
vulnerable to exogenous shocks such as the Asian crisis. 
Rent-seeking behaviour changed slightly in this period. Recourse to 
ordinary monopoly rents became more widespread and attempts to 
stop unwanted competition via arbitrary regulation and over-
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regulation became even stronger. Moreover, managers started to 
expropriate the enterprises they ran for themselves (cold 
privatisation, asset-stripping). Insider privatisation using a voucher 
system often had very negative affects. Firstly, vouchers were 
frequently not properly linked to enforceable property rights and 
secondly, managers had incentives to keep a considerable amount 
of the yield an enterprise earned for themselves or to engage in 
asset-stripping. 
Such situations can be best described using the principal-agent-
model applied by the New Institutional Economists. The basic 
point that is illustrated by this model is information-asymmetry. 
According to the model, an agent is working on behalf of the 
principal. However, the principal has difficulties in supervising and 
controlling all actions of the agent; he only sees the final results. If 
the principal were the owner of an enterprise in which the agent is 
the manager, the final results would be the yields earned within a 
year, for instance. If we exclude exogenous disturbance, the 
principal could directly infer the actions of her agent from the 
perceived results at the end of the year. However, ifwe allow for 
the possibility that exogenous disturbances might have influenced 
the final yields, the agent/manager can "invent" various excuses for 
bad results, while the principal cannot be completely sure what 
caused these results. 15 The problem of information-asymmetry 
described by this model is inherent in all forms of rent-seeking 
behaviour. The model also shows clearly what difficulties the 
separation of property and control within an enterprise can cause 
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and explains the need for comprehensive privatisation16 and the 
introduction of good corporate governance for enterprises. 
Information-asymmetry is aggravated in situations in which the 
basis on which people hold assets is not formalised. What is 
lacking in many transition economies, and especially in the 
Ukraine, is a well-established integrated formal property system 
together with enforceable contract rights. 
Within a regulatory framework of a functioning market economy, 
the "invisible hand" is said to co-ordinate the market participants' 
activities in such a way that their personal pursuit of profit results 
in higher prosperity for the community. In the Ukraine, at least 
until recently, all market conditions were set in a way that anybody 
who acted rationally would not act towards the common good. 
To my mind, the creation of a transparent legal property system and 
the strengthening of ownership rights are the cornerstones of 
healthy economic and, by extension, societal development, since 
they are working as disincentives for rent-seeking behaviour. Only 
by establishing these basic institutions, confidence in the reforms 
and in the market economy can be created. Thereby, agents will be 
incentivated to act towards each other in more co-operative ways as 
has been required for freedom in the introduction of this work. 
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Excursus: DeSoto's Property Effects17 
It is impossible to have a well-functioning market economy unless 
clearly defined ownership rights are established and unless those 
who assume obligations are held liable for the full extent of their 
assets. In a free society ownership-based rights and obligations 
must apply equally to all economic agents, whether they be the 
state, consumers, or producers. 
In former communist countries nobody really knows who owns 
what or where, who is accountable for the performance of 
obligations, who is responsible for losses and fraud, or what 
mechanisms are available to enforce payment for delivered services 
and goods. DeSoto describes the scenario of the undercapitalised 
sector of a developing country in a way that also applies to the bulk 
ofthe Ukrainian economy: 
a) The ownership of assets is difficult to trace and to validate. 
b) The economic environment is (largely) governed by a set of 
rules that is not legally recognised. 
c) Assets cannot be used in the most efficient way due to their 
unfixed nature and a huge amount of uncertainty leaving too 
much room for misunderstanding, reversal of agreement, etc. 
Note that De Soto is concerned mainly with the problem of shadow 
economies. I am going to deal with this issue a little bit later. 
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What is decisive now is that for him the creation of an integrated 
formal property system is the central political task. Let me 
summarise the main advantages he expects a formal property 
system to entail. All of these advantages are closely related to the 
issue of transaction cost reduction: 18 
1) The institution of formal property is a means to secure the 
interests of other parties and to create accountability by 
providing all the necessary information, references, rules, and 
enforcement mechanisms. For instance, formal property can 
be used as collateral for a loan, as equity exchanged for 
investment, etc. 
2) A well-established formal property system incorporates all 
the loose and isolated data about property into one integrated 
system, providing a transaction cost reducing rationalisation 
device. In former communist countries, on the contrary, there 
are dozens of property arrangements, managed by all sorts of 
organisations, some legal, some illegal. 
3) The integration of assets into a formal property system makes 
economic agents accountable for their decisions and actions. 
Through the institution of formal property people become 
linked to real estate and business in such a manner that people 
who, for instance, do not pay for goods or services received 
can be easily identified and charged. Authorities can learn 
about legal infractions and dishonoured contracts, can 
suspend services, place liens against property, etc. Legal 
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property functions as commitment and leads to a more 
sensitive perception of potential rewards and dangers since 
people will be cautious not to risk their stakes in the 
capitalist game. 
4) A formal property system provides standards for the 
description of assets and thereby reduces transaction costs. 
5) Due to all the factors described above formal property 
systems convert the citizens of a given society into a network 
of individually identifiable and accountable business agents. 
The institution of formalised property radically improves the 
flow of communication about assets and their potential. 
Moreover, it enhances the status oftheir owners, who then 
become economic agents able to transform assets within a 
broader network. 
6) A formal property system protects the security of ownership 
and produces trust in transactions. In doing so it allows 
economic agents to act without having to guard too 
extensively against other agents' opportunistic behaviour. 
What does prevent people in former communist countries from 
using modem formal property systems is often enough an opaque 
legal and administrative system. Therefore, property is frequently 
protected by all sorts of extralegal arrangements. These extralegal 
arrangements cannot be ignored when politicians want to create a 
formal property system. 
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Although informal institutions have not been manifested in statute 
books, they can be extremely forceful. If they undermine formal 
arrangements then the success of the latter is highly questionable; 
in extreme cases this might lead to a covered or even open civil 
war. The integration of informal rules into an acceptable formal 
property system is the ultimate prerequisite for social integration 
and stability. Only if the people of a country acknowledge the 
established property relations, the mass of the population will 
respect the law and will act so as to preserve the status quo. In 
transition economies the process of establishing such a system is 
bound to take time, since norms of behaviour, conventions and self-
imposed codes of conduct only adapt slowly to the new order. 
Furthermore, policy changes are less likely to have an impact on 
them. Therefore a pure transfer of a foreign institutional structure 
to one of these countries without paying attention to the informal 
rules still shaped by the previous system, is not likely to work well. 
Equally, trust in a new institutional framework and particularly in a 
new formal property system has to evolve. Apart from the 
necessary legal arrangements this process presupposes the 
formation of shared values (social consensus that can be reached by 
open and informed public discussion, education, etc.) and the 
adjustment of values to the new conditions and circumstances. The 
development of institutions does not happen in a vacuum - history 
counts. 
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Excursus: Gradual reform versus Big Bang? 
"The first phase after the political breakthrough is a very' 
important one. [ .. .] There's a special atmosphere and much 
euphoria. People are willing to accept radical changes. [ ... ] This 
first period is precious, because it can be used to launch as many 
painful changes as possible. Whenever there 's a window of 
opportunity, one should use it, because later it may be very difficult 
or impossible" (Balcerowicz, 2000) 19 
An important argument against hesitant reforms and partial 
liberalisation and privatisation efforts is that in many CIS countries 
the winners of these processes have often been able to block further 
progress in reform and to preserve the advantages for themselves. 
Especially in Russia and in the Ukraine, the partial level of reform 
generated significant income for those who had benefited from the 
initial allocation of property. 
Moreover, the more time passes, so the argument goes, "the more 
likely it is that resistance to reform will build as "losers" will 
become aware of the stakes, rent-seekers "learn the ropes", and 
politicians become attuned to the interests of both groups. This 
suggests that reforms should be implemented quickly. "20 
However, supporters of this school of thought do not have to deny 
that some gradualism in reform is needed anyhow. 40 to 70 years 
of communist rule cannot be wiped out overnight. Reforming 
markets without providing appropriate institutions at the same time 
may prevent the materialisation of the benefits of transition, both in 
43 
economic and political terms. Moreover, a consequent path of 
reforms does not contradict the fact that different countries have to 
deal with different initial conditions and that there is no "one suits 
all" path for all countries. Peculiarities have to be taken into 
account. Surely, time plays a decisive role in transition as the 
introductory quotation of this section suggests. But one should not 
insist that the more is pushed through the narrow window of 
opportunity, the better the political and economical outcome will be 
without qualifying the respective policy measures. The idea of 
"shock-therapy" seems to make only sense when the "shock" is 
really accompanied by some therapy. Within a climate of 
uncertainty, which is characteristic for transition, some certainty 
and confidence needs to be created by establishing institutions like 
the rule oflaw, adequate protection of property rights and effective 
corporate governance. Furthermore, far-reaching reforms and 
structural change require the establishment of a social safety net, 
which often has to be developed from scratch. Without such a 
safety net no country could sustain a massive reallocation of labour 
across sectors, since workers would lack incentives to leave 
inefficient enterprises and face a period of unemployment. This, 
unavoidably, leads to a lack of support for reforms. Thus, the whole 
issue of a good transition policy is not predominantly concerned 
with the speed of the reform process itselfbut rather with its quality 
and transparency. Privatisation and liberalisation are not ends in 
themselves. In order to facilitate sustained development and 
freedom, they need to be realised together with the development of 
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a stable institutional framework. The quality of this institutional 
framework can be measured by the strength of the legal 
environment, the certainty of contract enforcement and the actual 
respect for the law. 
Policies and Agricultural Development in the Ukraine 
The Ukraine has a considerable agricultural potential. It combines a 
large area (33.3 million hectare of cropland and 7.5 million hectare 
of permanent pasture) with fertile soils (roughly 40 per cent of the 
world's black soils). It has year-round ice-free ports and is situated 
close enough to key import markets such as the Middle East, 
Northern Africa and the EU. 
Despite these comparative advantages agricultural performance has 
been poor relative to expectations. The decline in agricultural 
production has been stronger than the decline in overall economic 
activity. Nevertheless, the agricultural sector remains one of the 
key sectors of the country. It employs one third of the labour force 
of the country and generates 11 to 12 per cent of GDP. 
Under central planning the agricultural sector of the SU was highly 
inefficient. Farms were large and characterised by high labour-land 
ratios. That led to problems in motivating and monitoring workers. 
Cost-plus pricing and the fact that subsidies were directed 
preferentially towards poor performers imply that there were only 
few penalties and even some rewards for waste. Moreover, farms 
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had to maintain a large social sphere including infrastructure 
maintenance, schools, cultural programmes, etc. 
After independence in 1991 market-oriented restructuring would 
have been the appropriate thing to do. However, the path of 
agricultural reforms was, and sometimes still is, characterised by 
arbitrary and inconsequent regulations and an artificially high 
degree of state intervention. These features support all kinds of 
opportunistic behaviour. 
Until 1992 the original sovkhozes and kolkhozes were transformed 
into collective agricultural enterprises (CAEs) and land was 
denationalised. 21 Farmland was passed on to collective ownership 
of the CAE members so that it could be shared and, at request of 
members, divided into plots with private land status. However, this 
transformation had been merely a formal change without any real 
restructuring taking place. Basically, physical plots of land and 
physical assets were given only to people leaving the farm in order 
to set up their own independent farms. Those remaining in the 
collective farm could "choose" to recommit their shares to the new 
CAE. Thus, most people received only entitlement certificates and 
not actual land plots or assets. 
Many important aspects within CAEs were not sufficiently 
regulated. Norms of management, the redistribution ofproperty and 
withdrawal procedures remained highly ambiguous. Furthermore, 
farm managers did not bear any responsibility for the financial 
results of their enterprises. Moreover they were usually elected 
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from the ranks of and by CAE members. That often encouraged 
them to postpone restructuring in order to be re-elected. 
Taking all that into consideration it is not surprising that CAEs 
remained highly inefficient. 
In 1991 a law had made private farming possible. By 1994, 32,000 
private farms had emerged (in 2001: 38,400). But the private farms 
remained mostly small (average of 56 hectare) and were less potent 
in shaping agricultural policies than the roughly 12,000 CAEs and 
their successor enterprises. 
In 1993 export quotas and licensing procedures were implemented. 
In this first period hardly any restructuring of enterprises took 
place. At the macro level fiscal and monetary imbalances led to 
hyperinflation (10,155 per cent in 1993). Therefore, the 
environment for any type of decent economic activity was less than 
encouraging. 
In 1994 Leonid Kuchrna became president and some important 
steps were taken like the creation of the legal basis that allows for 
the distribution of land shares to CAE members. 
By 1996 most quotas and licensing restrictions on exports had been 
eliminated. 
Unfortunately, many of the positive developments were reversed in 
the years between 1997 and 1999. It became apparent that only 
minimal changes had taken place behind the formally new facade 
of the CAEs. While members theoretically had the right to 
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individual land shares, they were often lacking the practical means 
of exercising this right. Land sale and rental were forbidden and 
individual land parcels were not demarcated.22 
Although quotas and licenses were abolished in 1996 in order to 
comply with IMF and World Bank conditions, those who already 
had benefited from the old techniques quickly invented alternative 
restrictions. So-called "indicative" and ••recommended"23 prices 
had no legal basis, but custom-officials would insist on their strict 
application. In order to avoid costly delays, traders would either 
have to resolve arising disputes on the spot with the custom-
official, or they were well advised to cultivate high-ranking 
contracts in Kiev, which could guarantee immunity. 
After the 1996 harvest, some oblast authorities managed to declare 
bans on grain exports, claiming to secure repayments for inputs that 
had been delivered in spring and assorted tax debts. In fact, they 
had no right to do so, but the central government hardly intervened. 
From 1997 to 1999 regional export bans and confiscation of grain 
and oil seeds were employed. Again the need to collect payments 
for earlier input supplies and debts was said to be the reason for 
introducing these measures. 
The Ukrainian President's Decree of3 December 199924 created 
considerable confidence in the reform process. It prescribed the 
restructuring of all CAEs that did not work profitably into 
enterprises based on private ownership. Furthermore, it granted the 
right to all members of CAEs to leave these enterprises freely and 
to withdraw their land and property shares. It also stipulated that 
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members would obtain their plots according to a defined procedure. 
If they chose to do so, they could use their plot to expand their 
private household plots or to rent it to agricultural enterprises. 
Finally, it prescribed that rent-payments for the use of a land plot 
must not be lower than 1 per cent of its value. 
By the second quarter of 2000, CAEs had mostly disappeared. In 
December 2000, 1 0,800 non-state agricultural enterprises had been 
transformed into 14,700 entities based on private ownership of land 
and property. In the same year, the government announced that it 
would withdraw from input supply and cancelled or restructured all 
farm debt to the state. However, the amount of optimism created by 
these announcements decreased considerably after subsequent 
government decisions have raised the spectre of export certification 
again and have introduced mandatory crop insurance (June 2000, 
January 2001 ). Moreover, by the beginning of 2001, only 400,000 
persons (out of 6,453,300, who had obtained land certificates) had 
actually received deeds that define a specific demarcated plot. 
In the food processing industry, a privatisation mechanism that 
gives supplying farms and the state 51 and 25 per cent of the shares 
respectively and allocates the rest to employees and sales, was 
introduced in 1996. It is remarkable, that in so-called "strategic" 
cases like grain marketing, the share remaining in state hands is 
larger and several key enterprises have been exempted from 
privatisation. Consequently, much of the food processing and 
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marketing sector remained monopolistic and inefficient. This in 
turn led to depressed farm-gate prices since many agricultural 
products are tradable and one has to take transportation and storage 
costs into account. 
The combination of the lack of restructuring and implicit taxation 
of agricultural prices over the years explains why most CAEs and 
their successors remained and remain unprofitable. 
Additionally it must be said that at least until October 2001 farms 
were not able to secure commercial loans by using land and other 
assets as collateral. Moreover, there remains a moratorium on the 
initiation ofbankruptcy procedures in agriculture until 2004. 
Combined with the fact that regular debt write-offs for farms in 
Soviet times had fostered a relatively cavalier attitude towards debt 
repayment, it is not surprising that farms are still not regarded as 
creditworthy and have little access to finance. This, of course, 
poses an obstacle to investment. 
One important reason for policy failures is that agricultural policy 
has been made by a variety of different bodies: Parliament, the 
Cabinet of Ministers (CMU), and the President pass laws, 
resolutions and decrees, while the Ministry of Agriculture, oblast 
authorities, custom officials and various state committees and state 
enterprises exercise a considerable amount of control over the 
practical implementation of the respective acts. 
The co-ordination between all the different authorities is very weak 
and responsibilities are not clearly divided. The maintenance of 
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such parallel structures is almost bound to fragment the policy 
making process in a rather non-transparent and unhealthy way. 
The Issue of Privatisation 
Decisive shortcomings and impediments to agricultural 
development are unclear and insufficiently formalised property 
relations. As pointed out before, the institution of private property 
poses a disincentive for opportunistic behaviour and is the 
precondition for a functioning market economy.25 Particularly in 
the farming sector, private ownership has three main functions: 26 
1) Private ownership ensures that there are real owners of 
assets/resources including not only land but also means of 
production. Thereby it promotes the productive use of resources, 
which is a precondition for effective management. 
2) Private ownership allows owners to use their assets as collateral. 
3) The threat of losing their assets makes owners/managers refrain 
from unreasonably risky decisions. Owners and managers will 
manage their enterprises with the purpose of maximising profits. 
This again is crucial for the productive use of resources and 
efficient management. 
Taking all this into account, the institution of private property not 
only provides proper incentives for increasing the profitability of 
enterprises, but also enhances individual freedom and 
responsibility. However, privatisation and restructuring efforts have 
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been unsatisfactory in the Ukraine for most of the time since 
independence. 
The presidential decree "On immediate measures to accelerate 
reform of the agricultural sector of the economy" from 3 December 
1999, has theoretically abolished collective ownership. CAEs have 
been reorganised into joint-stock companies, limited liability 
associations, co-operatives and private farms. However, farm-
restructuring efforts have not radically changed the entrenched 
collective organisation of Ukrainian farms. Land shares have been 
distributed to the members of former CAEs, but mostly only in the 
form of paper certificates without any physical demarcation of land 
or an actual allocation of assets to individuals. 
In a 1998 World Bank study, 70 per cent of farms reported that 
they retained a central management body patterned on the former 
collective farms, while only 30 per cent reported greater shifts of 
responsibility to autonomously operating entities. After eight years 
of reforms, individuals (private/family farms and household plots) 
cultivated only 15 per cent of agricultural land, while most of it 
remained collectivised. 
In the processing and marketing sector most up-and down-stream 
enterprises are only nominally private. They continue to act as 
para-statal agencies in accordance with state instructions and tend 
to be headed by former officials. Many of these officials were very 
successful in converting their position into the acquisition of 
substantial wealth as property is transferred from state to private 
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ownership. Precise ownership structures and the degree of state 
independence in these firms are still subject to lots of speculation. 
Enterprises used to oppose comprehensive privatisation in order to 
prevent any effective control of their activities. Leaving property 
rights unclear as long as possible provided many officials and farm 
managers with the opportunity to acquire legal ownership of 
property for themselves or to strip all valuable assets before its 
final privatisation. Due to unclassified property relations and a lack 
of independent controlling agencies they did not even have to fear 
much sanctioning. 27 What supported this opportunistic behaviour 
was the fact that most residents of agricultural areas continued to 
see their major interest in obtaining a maximum of state support. 
The danger of unemployment combined with the lack of social 
security makes people afraid of structural change. This fear was 
nourished and exploited by those who benefited from the 
restructuring delay. 
The Land Market 
Although a new Land Code has been passed on 25 October 2001 
(in spite of strong opposition by the Communist Party), trade of 
agricultural land is still not allowed until 2005.28 It is assumed that 
a functioning land market would be of vital importance. Firstly, it 
would allow land to move from less to more efficient operators. 
Secondly, it would ensure that land could be used as collateral for 
farms, and finally it would permit land to serve as a source of 
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revenue for pensioners and others in rural areas that are otherwise 
deprived of sufficient income.29 
Without the firm legal guidelines that are now provided by the new 
Land Code, land transactions were always tainted by the possibility 
that they may be overturned by higher-level legislation in the 
future. Thus, the legal certainty the code provides is highly 
appreciated. 
However, there are good reasons for the moratorium on the 
purchase of farmland. One of the strongest ones is the following. 
Currently the Ukrainian land market would not be competitive. If 
foreign subjects are not permitted to own farmland, only a 
relatively small number of wealthy and well-connected individuals 
who have access to a range ofbenefits and privileges would be able 
to purchase land in practice. Furthermore, most landowners are 
poorly informed about their rights. They often depend completely 
on farm managers as a source of information. Not surprisingly, the 
latter frequently happen to "filter" information for their private 
benefit. In exploiting the prevailing uncertainty they can also 
subject landowners, who are members of a collective farm, to 
considerable explicit coercion. 30 
Another danger likely to arise is that of speculation. People who are 
influential and rich enough could buy land today at depressed 
prices due to the mentioned information disadvantage that peasant 
landowners face and the lack of competition on the demand side. 
This would render their chances of selling land later at a profit 
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artificially high. Thus, on the one side we would find a small group 
ofwealthy, well-connected and well-informed buyers and on the 
other side a large group of poorly informed and dependent 
peasants. Such a severe asymmetry makes it likely that a land 
market without any provisions and restrictions would lead to the 
rapid concentration of land in the hand of only a few land barons. 
In order to prevent the creation of such a neo-feudal system, the 
public and especially the peasant landowners need to be educated 
about their rights. Public discussion, hopefully encouraged by the 
work of the media, should be one means of doing this. 
Moreover, for the duration of the moratorium an independent 
commission should make regular public reports on the status of the 
market for farmland. This agency must have unrestricted access to 
all information on land transactions. Furthermore, both 
lessors/lessees and sellers/buyers of farmland need to be provided 
with the opportunity to access low-cost impartial legal advice. 
Finally, it stands to reason that it is not really a good idea to 
prevent foreigners from purchasing agricultural land.31 If the land 
market were opened for foreigners this would increase competition 
and that in tum would be beneficial for Ukrainian land owners, 
since they would be able to sell their land for higher prices and 
under more favourable conditions. 
Preventing foreigners from purchasing agricultural land in the 
Ukraine is an exception to the practice of competitive land sale 
stipulated in chapter 21, Article 134/135 ofthe Land Code, whose 
economic purpose is not quite clear.32 
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Another perspective on the creation of a land market has not been 
considered much. Many people in former communist countries, 
especially in CIS countries, do not consider agricultural land to be a 
material factor that can be sold as any other.33 Land and soil are 
experienced as given by "Mother Nature", or in less poetic terms, 
as public goods. 34 Close emotional ties to the land seem to 
contradict the possibility of subjecting it to market forces. Much 
more than in Western economies, land is treated as a public good 
that must be owned and managed by the state for the benefit of all 
and that must be used for growing crops. 35 In accordance with this 
way of reasoning the Land Code stipulates that land which is 
suitable for agricultural needs shall be granted primarily for 
agricultural use. Thus the controversy about the land market in the 
Ukraine partly illustrates how important socially learnt values and 
conventions are. We cannot easily transform our Western concepts 
and laws concerning property and ownership to another country. 
The adaptation of new values that could support formal institutions 
will take time. A sense of social security and confidence in the 
developing economic and political system are essential for the 
success of this process. 
Some goods like natural resources and land, which are explicitly 
considered to be public goods or at least goods that should only be 
owned by the citizens of the respective country, are often subject to 
greater restrictive measures due to their perceived social 
significance. The idea that property implies something like social 
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obligation towards society is nicely expressed in articles 13 and 4 I 
of the Ukrainian constitution. The fact that these well-formulated 
and honourable premises are often in tension with the opportunistic 
behaviour of a fair number of Ukrainians in the rough world of 
transition, is of course unfortunate and shows that society has not 
arrived at a stable equilibrium yet. 36 
Importance of a Land Registry 
The transparency and efficiency of the Ukrainian land market is 
closely linked to the establishment of a sound land registry system. 
In the new Land Code the function of the State Land cadastre is 
defined as follows: "The state land cadastre is a unified state 
system of land cadastral operations that establishes the procedure 
for recognising the fact of acquisition or termination of the right of 
ownership and the right of use of land plots and contains a totality 
of information and documents on the location and legal regime of 
those plots, their assessment and land classification, as well as 
quantitative and qualitative characteristics, the division among 
d 37 land owners and ian users. 
According to the Land Code the land cadastre is meant to provide 
economic agents (the state, bodies of local self-government, 
enterprises, organisations, citizens) with sufficient information in 
order to regulate land relations. It provides the necessary data to 
determine the value ofland and to maintain an overview of the use 
of land, as well as assistance with measuring the ecological and 
economical soundness of business and land engineering plans. 
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With the introduction of such a unified system that includes full 
information on all land plots (a system of spatial co-ordinates and a 
system of identification of land plots), incentives for damaging 
speculation could be significantly reduced, opportunistic behaviour 
could be sanctioned more easily and a competitive land market 
with moderate transaction costs would be possible. A transparent 
land registry system therefore is essential for realising the positive 
property effects that De Soto illustrates: fixing the economic 
potential of assets, the integration of dispersed information into one 
system, enhanced accountability of economic agents, making assets 
fungible, social integration and the protection of transactions. 
However, in the case of the land market the effectiveness and 
efficiency of such a system is not independent of the costs that are 
invested in its maintenance. If the bureaucratic costs are too high 
(due to over-regulation and parallel decision structures) the costs 
can offset the benefits. Thus, responsibility structures have to be 
clarified and an appropriate measure of regulation needs to be 
found. Moreover, if regulation and state interference were to 
restrict private initiative and entrepreneurship in a manner that goes 
beyond the prevention of negative externalities, the success ofthe 
land market and the freedom of economic agents would be 
endangered. 
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Excursus: Short-Term Effects of the New Land Code on Rural 
Finance38 
Although the new Land Code plays a decisive role in providing 
long-tenn benefits, in the short run its effects will be rather 
moderate. As mentioned above, in the long run it is likely to 
promote legal certainty (which is essential for investment), 
facilitate the development of a mortgage credit system and 
contribute to the social security of the rural population. 
Article 90 of the Land Code stipulates that owners of land plots 
have the right to sell or alienate in any other way a land plot, lease 
it to others, mortgage it and pass it to their heirs. In section XI/6 it 
postulates that the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine shall establish a 
State Land (Mortgage) Bank with a corresponding infrastructure 
and introduce state registration of rights to land. However, 
mortgage crediting is not going to play a significant role in 
Ukrainian agriculture in the near future. The main reason for this is 
that usually the farmland is not owned by the agricultural 
enterprise, which cultivates it. Enterprises are leasing most of their 
land from a number of small landowners. Remember that in the 
course of restructuring approximately 6.5 million land certificates 
were issued. On this basis 5,615 million leasing contracts were 
completed by 2000. A typical agricultural enterprise today is 
cultivating an area of roughly 4000 hectare, but from this land only 
100 hectare are usually owned by its founders. Now consider that 
the relative price for one hectare offannland is 600 US$. For an 
area of 1 00 hectare this amounts to 60,000 US$. If we assume that 
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a mortgage can be raised on 60 per cent of this amount that leaves 
us with 36,000 US$. However, the costs for a combine harvester, 
for example, would already amount to 200,000 US$! Therefore, 
since enterprises are not allowed to acquire the ownership of more 
than 100 hectare of agricultural land until 20 l 0 (Land Code, 
Section X/13), at least until this point in time they will have to 
finance themselves through their own profits. 
WTO Accession and the Regulatory Environment 
Frequent and retroactive changes and a non-transparent network of 
standardisation and certification procedures have poisoned the 
Ukrainian regulatory environment for a long time. This situation 
needs to be changed dramatically for the achievement of 
sustainable development and growth. The restructuring of trade 
barriers is an essential precondition for the country's accession to 
the World Trade Organisation. 39 The pressure resulting from the 
entrance conditions posed by the WTO is likely to strengthen 
agricultural policies and institutions in the Ukraine. Its rules 
prohibit a range of distortive policies such as export taxes and non-
tariff barriers. Moreover, by requiring that trade policies be applied 
to all trading partners equally and by providing transparency and 
clear criteria for regulations, the prospective membership can also 
reduce the scope and incentives for rent-seeking and corruption. 
One starting point for that is that the GATT Working Party (WP) 
has demanded that the Ukraine supply more detailed information 
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about its system of government regulation and import restrictions 
and a more comprehensive description of the state support system 
for agricultural producers. So far, agricultural policy has been in a 
constant flux. What is needed now is the implementation of 
consistent measures. The fulfilment of the demands associated with 
WTO accession would serve to create trust in the Ukraine as a 
possible trading partner and a secure place for foreign investment. 
Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers 
The application of import-tariffs in the Ukraine is highly opaque. 
Many exemptions such as import quotas at reduced tariff rates, are 
granted to specific firms at specific times in a non-competitive 
manner. The combination of import protection with the numerous 
exemptions to this system generates significant rents, which are 
sought by those cultivating connections to politicians in Kiev. 
Although the Ukraine does not apply explicit export subsidies, the 
continuous government intervention in agricultural development 
has inhibited agricultural development enormously. Officials apply 
minimum export prices for hides and animal skins, sugar and 
oilseeds40, although they deny this. There are also many reports that 
custom officials refuse to permit exports when the export contracts 
specify prices that are below the recommended level. These 
restrictions applied particularly to grain exports in 1999 and 2000. 
During this period traders were at least temporarily unable to obtain 
necessary certificates because of the uncertainty regarding the 
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status of official grain inspection requirements.41 Besides the 
mentioned export impediments, borders between oblasts often 
represent significant obstacles for intra-Ukrainian trade. Restricting 
measures employed by local authorities such as complicated and 
arbitrary checks at various oblast borders do increase the 
transaction costs producers and traders face.42 These enormous 
additional costs, which include the increased trading risk, are less 
than attractive to potential trading partners within the country and 
abroad. Both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade are subject to 
frequent and often retroactive change. Therefore these measures, 
applied as they are, have the same effect as an explicit tax on trade. 
Traders attempt to compensate for the expected risk by demanding 
higher margins and by paying producers less for their products than 
they would have under more reliable conditions. The only 
beneficiaries of this system are those living by rent-seeking and 
corruption activities, which thrive on non-competitiveness and a 
certain amount of chaos. However, rent- seeking only works until 
resources are finished. This brings me to the next section: the issue 
of state subsidies. 
Subsidies 
"Providing subsidies to agriculture in the Ukraine is like doping 
an untrained athlete. The doping might help for a while (if side-
effects are ignored), but it also reduces the incentives to train 
effectively "43 
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To put the conclusion right in the beginning: subsidies in the fonn 
of credits and tax write-offs and preferential administrative 
treatment have helped many CAEs to avoid necessary restructuring 
such as cost-cutting, the reduction of the company workforce and 
the adjustment of production. 
The Vicious Circle 
If the number of new jobs rises slowly there is a tendency to delay 
restructuring by granting subsidies and a range of preferential 
administrative and legislative treatment to state-owned enterprises. 
These measures pose disadvantages for the private sector by 
subjecting it to a high tax burden to finance the respective subsidies 
and therefore inhibit proper competition. That, in turn, hampers the 
creation of new jobs in the private sector and often hampers the 
refonn process. Subsidisation continues and competition becomes 
more and more distorted. The longer this process continues, the 
more it will erode the willingness of private entrepreneurs to set up 
new companies and to create new jobs within the country. Capital 
flight is the logical consequence.44 It is important to realise that the 
delay of restructuring within a sector does not save jobs. On the 
contrary, when enterprises oppose transfonnation, they will remain 
unable to compete and consequently even more jobs will be lost. 
What the state should do to satisfy its responsibility towards the 
citizens is to set up a social security system that can ease the risk of 
unemployment by providing people with sufficient support.45 If 
they are able to leave their work place in order to find employment 
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in another enterprise or even in a different sector of the economy, 
they will be less likely to oppose necessary restructuring. 
Moreover, through a more efficient allocation of human capital, 
which is greatly dependent on the existence of a social safety net 
and the provision of education, productivity is going to increase 
considerably. 
The absence o(hard budget constraints 
State subsidies have been quite helpful to managers who were 
interested in postponing reforms in order to acquire property at no 
costs to themselves (asset-stripping, cold privatisation). Moreover, 
they have fostered a highly irresponsible attitude towards debt 
repayment and have contributed to the large budget deficit and 
macroeconomic instability, which is strangling the country. The 
misuse of subsidies is possible because ownership rights within 
CAEs are poorly defined and managers cannot be held liable to the 
full extent of their assets and because the targeting of state support 
is highly deficient. The principle of profitability has not been taken 
into account sufficiently. This principle implies that hard budget 
constraints have to be applied and that a company operating at a 
loss should go bankrupt, otherwise it is a strain on the economy. 
Additionally, the introduction ofuniform accounting and reporting 
standards for enterprises is necessary in order to monitor these 
budget constraints. Their application would make it harder for 
managers to hide information and thereby reduce their incentives to 
engage in rent-seeking activities, moral hazard and asset-
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stnppmg. But up to 1999/2000 the pnnciple of profitability and 
the implementation of hard budget constraint have been considered 
to be politically unfeasible. 
Input supply subsidies 
The most important and most distortive measure of farm support 
prior to 2000 consisted of input supply advances to CAEs. Funds 
were transferred to suppliers, who in tum supplied farms with 
inputs. Oblast governors were responsible for collecting repayment 
in the form of agricultural commodities. In order to do that these 
officials often introduced bans on the shipment of grains and 
sunflower seeds from their oblasts until farms repaid their debts. 
Here the unfortunate link between subsidisation and the 
implementation of trade barriers becomes apparent. In 1998, for 
instance, government provided 1.8 billion UAH worth of input to 
the farms. Farmers only supplied one third of the value ofthis 
input, leaving a remaining debt of 1.176 billion UAH. In the same 
year 70 million UAH of farm tax debts were cancelled and a further 
698 million UAH deferred.47 In 1999, 41 million UAH ofloans 
were written off and 533.4 million UAH were restructured.48 
Moreover, all farms have been exempted from paying VAT in the 
years from 1999 to 2004 and only have to pay 30 per cent of the 
Fixed Agricultural Tax. These tax privileges amounted to 208 
million UAH of subsidies in 1999. In May 2000, all farm debts to 
the state ( 6.8 billion UAH accumulated between 1994 and 1999) 
were written off. This means that all budget loans disbursed and tax 
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arrears accumulated in 1998/99 have, with hindsight, to be 
considered as direct subsidies. 
Regrettably, all these subsidies provided by the government did not 
increase the efficiency ofCAEs. In 1999, 85 per cent of the CAEs, 
which were the main beneficiaries of the spending, were 
technically bankrupt. However, this outcome could have been 
anticipated. While financial flows were pumped into the 
maintenance of unprofitable enterprises without forcing them to 
restructure, almost nothing had been invested into the development 
of human capital and technology. Agricultural education, research 
and rural infrastructure development - the most important sources 
of medium and long-term growth - have been neglected 
tremendously. Finally, in 2000 the government stopped supplying 
inputs to farms in the form of zero-interest rate budget loans. 
Instead it started to encourage private suppliers and banks to 
finance the sector by providing 50 per cent interest rate subsidies 
on commercial loans. This mechanism of interest compensation has 
considerable advantages compared with other forms of 
subsidisation, since the creditworthiness of the applicant is assessed 
by a commercial bank interested in the correctness of this 
assessment and not by the state. Consequently, it is less likely that 
unprofitable enterprises will be supported. 
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Rural Finance - Risk and Trust 
In the Ukraine it is not the lack of capital, but rather the lack of 
creditworthiness that poses an obstacle to establishing sound credit 
relationships. The shortage of financial liquidity is an expression of 
the extremely high risk posed by the uncertainty and non-
enforceability oflegal titles. The shortcomings of the institutional 
framework, which regulates the relationship between lenders and 
borrowers and problems related to the Ukrainian banking system, 
are a major development impediment. 
What is preventing both foreigners and domestic agencies from 
supplying credit to farmers is the high risk of non-repayment 
caused by a high degree of information asymmetry. One reason for 
non-repayment is that many agricultural enterprises are highly 
inefficient. Labour productivity, for example, is very low due to the 
high amount of unemployment hidden on these farms. 49 Land and 
input productivity is very low as well. Inputs are often used in 
accordance with standards applied in the 1970s and 1980s. Well-
educated mangers, who could improve these shortcomings, are 
scarce. 5° 
Yet the key problem is that banks and other potential lenders are 
not in a position to enforce their claims on farms because the 
required legal instruments are missing. This provides farm 
managers with strong incentives not to repay loans although they 
might be perfectly able to do so. 51 Banks and other lenders, on the 
other hand, are not able to judge whether borrowers will be both 
able and willing to pay2; they cannot judge the creditworthiness of 
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potential borrowers. This information asymmetrl3 combined with 
the lack oflegal certainty increases enormously the risk of 
providing credits and causes lenders to charge very high interest 
rates and to abstain from issuing long-term credits. 54 What is 
needed to lower this risk is trust. 55 One important way of creating 
trust is the development of a variety of institutions that can lower 
the costs of information asymmetry. One of the most important 
cornerstones would be the clarification of property relations within 
the enterprises, which are looking for credit. If managers could be 
held responsible for their actions with the full amount of their 
assets then they would act in more considered way. For this to 
work out, the existence and implementation of a bankruptcy law is 
decisive. Together with a couple of other laws which protect the 
rights of lenders, such as credit registries and transparent 
accounting systems, it would allow financial institutions to act in a 
more confident manner. By providing legal certainty and an 
enforcement device in the case of non-repayment, bankruptcy laws 
increase the willingness of lenders to provide loans. Therefore, they 
should be in the best interest of farmers, who are dependent on 
such financial flows. 
If commercial banks and other financial institutions can work 
within a stable legal framework then they will have strong 
incentives to evaluate all potential investment projects carefully, 
especially when they face the competition of other lending 
institutions. Managers of agricultural enterprises will have to 
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demonstrate to them that they can revamp the organisational 
structure of farms, reduce the labour force and increase 
productivity before they get the chance to apply for a loan. 
Therefore, the financial support of genuinely unprofitable projects 
will become less likely and managers will be incentivated to initiate 
the necessary restructuring (unless they are able to squeeze more 
money out of the state budget). The risk is much higher when state 
lending institutions supply credits. They have to operate in the 
same environment as commercial banks do and are consequently 
also confronted with the problem of information asymmetry. 
However, in the case of state lending institutions, their situation is 
aggregated by the fact that they are often under considerable 
political pressure to provide loans to loss-making enterprises. 
The significance of the presidential Decree "On urgent measures 
for accelerating agricultural reform" from 3 December 1999 has 
been mentioned above, but it is worth mentioning some of its 
implications for rural finance. By stipulating that all CAEs have to 
restructure to form new entities and to distribute land shares, the 
decree increased the creditworthiness of Ukrainian farms. It 
clarified the relationship between farm managers and farm 
members and it reduced members' participation in the decision 
making process. Consequently, the decision making process 
became more transparent. This, in tum, has reduced farm 
managers' incentives to steal from their farms. 
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As mentioned above, in early 2000 the government withdrew from 
its direct involvement in agricultural input supply and resorted to 
the implementation of a partial interest compensation mechanism. 
All these policy changes had a positive effect on the 
creditworthiness of Ukrainian farms. Due to restructuring, reduced 
government interference and the increased responsibility of farm 
managers the profitability of farms has increased. 56 Additionally, 
the business environment for banks improved due to stabilised 
macroeconomic conditions. This led to falling interest rates, less 
government intervention into the banking sector and improved 
expertise within banks for assessing the creditworthiness of 
agricultural enterprises. 
The Social Security Network 
The development of a social security system that provides basic 
and targeted support to those in need is not only of moral, but also 
of political and economic importance. Politically it is necessary to 
overcome resistance to reform. By creating new employment 
opportunities and social fallback options for those displaced by the 
sheer scope and pace of structural change, the implementation of a 
security network eases the effects of transition. Thereby, it is 
decisive in breaking the hold of vested interests over reform 
policies. 
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The present form of the social security system leaves the economy 
over-regulated and under heavy financial pressure without 
achieving even a minimum of income security above the poverty 
line for the sick, the old and the unemployed. 57 The very high 
social security contribution rate ( 49 per cent in 1999) is a 
disincentive for many to work and save in the official economy. 58 
Despite the high social security contribution rate, no health 
insurance system based on contributions has been established. 
Although there are no official fees, people have to "bribe" their 
way to medical treatment. 
In 1997, 49.8 per cent of the population had an income ofless than 
90 UAH per month, while the cost of a minimum food basket was 
approximately 64 UAH. As these low-income groups have to spend 
most of their money for food, they can hardly afford anything else 
(medical treatment, for instance). 
One of the most vulnerable groups in the country is the group of 
pensioners. Due to the small size of their pensions and non-regular 
payments they are often not able to afford even a minimum food 
basket. The average life expectancy fell since 1990 from 65.4 to 
61.1 years for men and from 74.0 to 72.8 for women. Instead of 
developing a sound social security system that could increase the 
income of the most vulnerable, the government has pumped budget 
resources into price subsidies for communal services and food and 
the continued exemption of some part of energy consumption from 
taxation. The problem with this kind of social benefit is that the 
beneficiaries of price subsidies are all households, including those 
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that do not need any support. In the case of energy supply, the 
practice leads to rather absurd consequences. Given that the benefit 
depends on the amount consumed (the larger the consumption the 
larger the subsidy received) and given that low income households 
will generally lack the means to install appliances, which would 
raise energy consumption, it is likely that the share of subsidies 
received by wealthier households continues to increase. Similar 
reservations have to be made when it comes to subsidising food 
prices. In the case of agricultural products subsidised consumption 
has a clear price depressing effect on food producers, and thus on 
the prices agricultural producers receive. Thereby, income is taken 
from farmers and given partly to consumers and partly to the state 
budget. Assuming those Ukrainian agricultural producers are not 
really the most well off sector of the population, this "redistribution 
technique" does not seem to make much sense. 59 Moreover, 
consumers are encouraged to waste the subsidised product due to 
its artificially low price. And last but not least, government will 
have to spend its scarce resources to ensure that the cheap products 
are not re-sold on the world market at higher prices. 60 So on the 
whole, price subsidies and government intervention in the market 
are highly costly and their benefits are disputable, to say the least. 
Furthermore, they enforce the irresponsible attitude towards 
consumption that was developed under communism. 
Another signpost of misguided government policies is the 
maintenance of the social sphere of enterprises. This is considered 
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to be a part of the social security system and subsidised by the 
government. The role of the enterprise as a provider of social 
benefits is a survival from communist times. In the Soviet Union 
enterprises often provided and paid for workers utilities (heating, 
hot water). They ran their own canteens, health facilities, owned 
vacation houses that provided cheap holidays and subsidised child 
care. In addition to some ideological reasons for anchoring social 
benefits in enterprises, linking them to working for a monopoly 
employer, the state, ensured political obedience. Those who did not 
work for the state were treated as non-persons. 
Although expenditure on the social sphere of enterprises has 
decreased considerably after independence, in 1999 the level of 
expenditure still amounted to about 4 per cent of GOP. The fact 
that this sphere remains incorporated in the enterprise today 
impedes the mobility ofboth labour and capital; and it hinders 
progress in privatisation and the purchase and sale of enterprises 
because potential buyers may fear the costs associated with 
maintaining a mandatory social sphere. Employees are reluctant to 
abandon the benefits combined with the location of their work 
place, particularly if housing is provided. On the other hand, the 
maintenance of the social sphere provides managers with extra 
power over their workers. They can direct the members of their 
enterprises as they please by threatening them with exclusion from 
social benefits.61 This dependency of workers is clearly opposed to 
real freedom of choice. The high degree of risk aversion hinders 
people from "inventing" themselves and to take their life into their 
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own hands. Consequently, they rather face the harassment and 
adopt their preferences to the perceived boundaries of feasible 
options. Only the provision of an alternative social security system, 
that encourages responsible agency and the beginning of open 
discussion and political participation can break up this circle of fear 
and dependency and enable people to move on in the new game of 
capitalism. 
To avoid the shortcomings and dangers of the subsidisation of 
certain goods and services and the social sphere of enterprises, 
these measures have to be replaced by targeted support to those in 
need of it. This would not only decrease the degree of dependency 
and irresponsibility among the beneficiaries but it would also 
generate net savings for the state budget. Furthermore, without 
going into the details of creating an efficient pension system, health 
insurance and unemployment insurance62 , government should 
reduce the barriers for private providers of social security services 
(e.g. health insurance, pension funds, education, etc.) to open the 
doors for competition and improved services. Of course, some 
regulation and secure and independent monitoring of social 
insurance on the basis of regular balance sheets and income 
expenditure statements is important. 
Education 
The provision of education plays an important distributive role 
especially in a transition country like the Ukraine. One reason for 
that is that inequality measured by the Gini coefficient has already 
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risen to higher levels than the average level in OECD countries. If 
we acknowledge a high economic growth potential in the long run, 
then the initial worsening of the income distribution could be 
corrected in the medium run, if the currently economically deprived 
households could participate better in the primary distribution of 
that rising future income. This is going to happen, if their income 
generating power is promoted. Education is both decisive for the 
earning potential of individuals and for economic growth.63 
Thereby it enhances people's capability to help themselves and 
others and to assume responsibility. Therefore, access to education 
should be kept open. However, one should keep in mind that means 
testing could have positive effects on the overall situation of the 
educational system in the Ukraine. Currently, the lack of such 
means testing combined with the reduction of finance especially for 
higher education institutions means that it becomes more and more 
difficult for these institutions to offer quality services to their 
students. Consequently, to some extent these institutions have 
resorted to accepting payment in exchange for admitting students. 
This process is going to weaken admission standards and the 
provision of higher education is likely to become dependent on the 
ability to pay.64 So there is a need to introduce tuition fees and 
means testing with respect to higher education, because that would 
improve the financial situation of these institutions and inhibit the 
crowding out of qualified people by those who have the money to 
buy their seat in the lecture theatre. By providing loans to students 
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who are members of low-income households, the government 
would keep access to higher education open for everyone. 
While the inefficient and costly version of the social insurance 
system incentivates people to invest their capital in other countries 
or to retreat to the informal sector, a system of substantial direct 
support to low income households combined with an efficient 
social insurance system is more likely to promote incentives to 
work, learn and invest in the official economy.65 
The Shadow Economy 
In 1998 the share of the Ukrainian shadow economy was measured 
to be around 40 to 50 per cent of GNP. The main reasons for its 
growth were a lack of opportunities in the formal sector66, the 
burden of administrative controls on foreign and domestic trade, 
unformalised property relations, high and frequently altered 
taxation and the strain of social security contributions. Note that it 
is the combination of these reasons rather than one ultimate reason 
that causes the shift from the formal to the informal sector. For 
instance, we would apply a too narrow perspective if we just 
claimed that people resort to the extralegal sector because it is a tax 
heaven.67 
In order to combat hyperinflation the Ukrainian government 
reintroduced most administrative controls in 1993. The resulting 
over-regulation has played a significant role in the decline of the 
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formal sector of the economy and the formation of the shadow 
economy. 
The formation of the underground economy has some interesting 
implications for the discussion of freedom measured by the amount 
of regulation within society. One can hypothesise the following: Up 
to a certain point the intensification of administrative measures by 
the state leads to positive or even increasing marginal yields. This 
means that increasing regulation would lead to increased control 
over economic activity. But from this point onward any further 
intensification of administrative measures leads to a decrease of 
real control over economic activity. This would be the point when 
people start leaving the official sector and resort to the shadow 
economy. This hypothesis can be illustrated by reference to the 
issue of tax regulation. If government tries to combat the weak 
payment discipline (partly due to the bad economic situation, partly 
due to a relatively lax payment attitude and a lack of credible 
sanctions) with increased administrative controls, this is likely to 
encourage people to flee to the informal sector and thus lead to 
decreasing state revenues. One might, of course, object, that it is 
not the amount of regulation but rather its transparency and 
comprehensiveness that is decisive. However, I suppose that the 
increase of regulation beyond a certain point is very likely to lead 
to an opaque regulatory system. 
The institution of the Ukrainian shadow economy is inefficient but 
stable. It is inefficient because the transaction costs arising within 
the informal sector (information, negotiation and enforcement 
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costs) are rather high. Extralegal businesses have to hide their 
operations from authorities. They have to make transfers outside 
legal channe't's; they are not able to hold property efficiently to 
enforce contracts through the courts. They cannot secure formal 
credit and they cannot raise sufficient money for investment. 
Moreover, the only insurance available to them is that provided by 
"local protection services". Long-term investment does not occur 
and many transactions, which would be beneficial to economic 
agents, simply do not come about due to prohibitive transaction 
costs. 
It is remarkable that even if the state reduces its controls and 
restrictions, economic agents will only react to this with significant 
delay. Such stability can be explained as follows: The stability of 
an institution is linked to the costs of its establishment. With every 
additional transaction that is performed within the current 
institutional matrix, the costs per completed transaction decrease. 
Thus, the longer an economic agent is working and investing 
within this institution the more expensive it becomes for her to 
leave that path. Furthermore, if somebody is working in the shadow 
economy, then her business partners also tend to be situated in the 
informal sector. Thus, if she goes back to the official economy, she 
would have to invest lots of energy in order to establish an efficient 
co-operative network again. However, if an agent entertains 
positive expectation about a return to the official sector, the costs 
needed for that change (sunk costs) would not alter her decision to 
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do so. What is needed to encourage people to return to the formal 
sector of the economy is comprehensive large-scale deregulation 
combined with the opening of investment opportunities. 
Furthermore, people need to realise that a return to the formal 
sector and to legality is going to strengthen their standing in 
society. Only members of the legal system of a country can 
exercise their full political, economic and social rights. Here the 
necessary link between rights and duties becomes apparent. People 
remaining in the extra-legal sphere are weak in many respects. 
They cannot live up to their rights because they have left the realm 
where these rights apply and thus have also lost the basis on which 
they could fight for them. Thus, if people remain in the informal 
sector, they will forfeit an essential component of their freedom 
and development potential. 
Transparency and Competition 
A Leitmotiv that winds its way through all these considerations is 
the issue of transparency. What is needed for sustainable 
development in a transition economy such as the Ukraine, and in 
particular for the development of the agricultural sector of the 
country, is not the absence of any kind of regulation, but rather its 
predictable and transparent implementation. Regulation 
implemented in such a manner is the complement of competition. 
"The "invisible hand" of the market depends heavily on the 
support of a thick "glove" of rules, norms, and institutions, 
including governments. But too often the glove is opaque, 
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obscuring flows of information essential to the efficient and 
equitable functioning of both markets and the national and 
international institutions that regulate them "68 The call for more 
transparency has become very fashionable in recent times. It 
usually goes together with the demand for strengthening the 
corporate governance structures of enterprises. However, the 
concept of transparency takes different, even though related 
meanings in different contexts. In the realm of politics it refers to 
enabling citizens to learn about government activities by obtaining 
information provided by the government. Transparency is therefore 
an essential component of political freedom. In economics and 
finance transparency means "the process by which information 
about existing conditions, decisions, and actions is made 
accessible, visible, and understandable "69 
What all definitions have in common is that transparency is always 
closely linked to accountability. As Fiorini expresses it: "the 
purpose of calls for transparency is to permit citizens, markets, or 
governments to hold others accountable for their policies and 
performance". 
Making agents accountable for their actions is closely linked to 
attempts to overcome the principal-agent problem, that is, the 
difficulties (due to information-asymmetry) principals face in 
ensuring that their agents do what the principals want them to do. 
I have already discussed this problem with respect to insider 
privatisation of former state owned agricultural enterprises. 
Strikingly enough, although an important argument for this kind of 
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voucher privatisation has been fairness, its result has mostly been 
an increase in inequality. In many cases managers have effectively 
expropriated minority investors (namely the members of the 
respective enterprises). Due to the opaqueness of the privatisation 
process, unclear property relations and the absence of well-
functioning laws, managers engaging in asset-stripping and outright 
theft were the winners at the end. This practice has been reinforced 
by the absence of hard budget constraints, a lack of competition 
and government corruption. 
In the absence of competition, managers were neither inclined to 
restructure their enterprises in accordance with the principle of 
profitability nor to increase the transparency of their actions. 
Government was often too involved into the wheelings and 
deelings of businessmen to take action against them or it was 
simply not able to perceive what was actually going on. Instead, 
subsidies were pumped into unprofitable enterprises without 
questioning the reasons for the lack of profitablility. 
As pointed out earlier, burdening newly established enterprises 
financed the costs of subsidising. Moreover, a whole range of often 
arbitrary rules and restrictions (certification and standardisation 
procedures, a complicated tax-system, trade barriers, etc.) made it 
incredibly difficult for newcomers to establish themselves in the 
market. Despite ongoing privatisation the market has remained the 
playground for only a few inefficient enterprises. Competition 
agencies such as the Ukrainian Anti-Monopoly Committee have 
not focused sufficiently on the elimination of entry barriers for new 
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enterprises and their influence has often been too weak. With all its 
administrative power and lobbied by influential interest groups, 
government and other executive bodies have prevented competition 
by abstracting the entry of new domestic and foreign enterprises 
and by simultaneously granting privileges to favoured existing 
ones. 
Under non-competitive conditions it is difficult to encourage 
enterprises to disclose information. If, on the other hand, 
enterprises compete in the market and are forced to work in 
accordance with the principle of profitability, then an enhanced 
level of transparency and a good corporate governance would be 
crucial to reassure stockholders and potential investors about the 
quality of management and the profitability of the enterprise. Thus, 
if competition prevails, enterprises will be incentivated to provide 
information voluntarily as to use transparency and good corporate 
governance as a comparative advantage in the market. And only 
under these circumstances will management have no alternative 
other than to clarify ownership and responsibility structures within 
the enterprise as well as initiate restructuring. 
Implications 
What do we learn from all these mistakes? Firstly, I would say that 
they confirm Amartya Sen's integrated approach to development as 
freedom. But furthermore we see how important Hayek's emphasis 
on non-arbitrary regulation and the rule of law is in order to avoid 
the abuse of discretionary powers. 
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Many different aspects have to be taken into account and only by 
interacting will they suffice to lift the level of development in a 
country. Policy advisors cannot just focus on liberalisation and 
privatisation although these processes are very important. They 
also have to pay attention to the manner and the setting in which 
these processes are performed. 
For responsibility and accountability to evolve it is not enough to 
transform state ownership into private ownership. The 
transformation has to be managed in a transparent way, meaning 
that all participating agents ought to have access to the relevant 
information. For this to work it is not only essential that 
information is provided but also that the recipients of information 
are able to use it to evaluate the provider of it according to some 
accepted standard of behaviour. Thus, the prevalence of a common 
set of values and social norms is a precondition for the 
meaningfulness of any call for transparency and accountability. 
In order to shape these values and norms education and open public 
discussion play a decisive role. For them to be effective the free 
competition of ideas and a free and vibrant media are of utmost 
importance. 
It seems to be intuitively true that a free and vibrant media, a strong 
civility and a "good" educational system are desirable for a 
democratic and free society. However, this tells us neither how to 
change things in practice nor who would be in charge of such a 
change. Opinions might even diverge strongly when it comes to 
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defining what a "strong civility" and a "good educational system" 
could mean. 
Especially when people talk about the necessity of a vigilant "civil 
society", it is hard to say what the content of this concept may be. 
I agree that the laws of the state need to be supported by certain 
social norms, values and conventions, but it is difficult to give any 
advice as how to influence such norms if they are in tension with 
the formal order. As Philip Pettit points out: "We know little or 
nothing about how to generate widespread civility where it has 
more or less ceased to exist. Who is to say what the state can do in 
a society where civility and the expectation of civility are at a 
minimum - where there is little social capital- and where people 
only put their trust in friends andfami/y?70 
While governance structures can be changed in a short time, the 
general institutional environment (economics of property rights and 
other formal rules) adjusts under normal circumstances over more 
than a decade and the informal institutions, customs, traditions and 
norms of a society might change only over centuries. 71 Even if we 
assume that the process in transition economies is accelerated by 
the rapid break down of the communist block, we probably have to 
accept that our opportunities to calculate the evolution of informal 
institutions are rather insignificant. Thus, one can and probably has 
to acknowledge the importance of informal institutions such as 
social norms, etc., but policy makers and economic advisors should 
have a hard time in influencing or even changing them. 
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In the Ukraine people have been confronted with a predatory state 
for most of the time after independence. This means that the state, 
or at least a considerable fraction of it, was until very recently less 
interested in maximising social welfare but rather in supporting 
the narrow vested interests of certain influential groups. This 
climate has only started to change slightly over the last two years. 
How is one supposed to change an environment of opportunism 
and corruption when such patterns of behaviour are not even 
considered to be particularly blameworthy? Punishments that deter 
people in stable democratic societies from cheating are nearly 
always so mild that we hardly notice them. Severe punishment such 
as imprisonment plays a relatively minor role in deterring people 
from defection. It is more the combination ofhints and clues that 
our fellow citizens use to communicate their disapproval when we 
go astray. That makes it clearer, why it is so difficult to reform a 
country like the Ukraine where corruption and criminality have 
become relatively socially acceptable. Altering the culture of 
society or its pool of knowledge is a requirement for its successful 
reformation, but as we know, people do not change habits of a 
lifetime overnight. 
As long as there is no established common standard in society that 
holds the opportunism of state officials and enterprise managers as 
blameworthy, then all calls for transparency and accountability 
made by outsiders will not make much sense. The political and 
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economic circumstances under communism supported, rather than 
punished rent-seeking behaviour and free riding. Opportunism is 
not a new phenomenon; it has a long history. By the 1980s, 
bargaining and black market trading within and outside the official 
distribution networks permeated the Soviet economic system. Thus, 
even before its dissolution, the socialist state had lost a great deal 
of control over the final allocation of resources and was concerned 
considerably with the allocation of rents among public servants. 
Additionally, due to a lack of proper incentives (e.g. the absence of 
private property) and the fact that decisions were basically made 
for citizens, people did not learn to take responsibility. On the other 
hand, government rules were not accepted as being legitimate by a 
great part of the population. They were only reluctantly, or even 
resentfully, respected. Thus, trust in the political order was low. 
Under these conditions opportunistic behaviour was not regarded as 
a major offence or crime but rather as a basic means to survive in a 
comfortable manner. Over time it became more and more common 
place. 72 The more people were engaging in it, the less it was 
regarded as blameworthy. People did not feel guilty for stealing or 
covering information. This attitude prevails until today in many ex 
- socialist states, and it will take a while until a changed incentive 
structure will lead to a different understanding. 
Another point worth mentioning is the following. In former 
socialist states people were subject to the surveillance by a well 
established network of secret services. This network was definitely 
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not encouraging any kind of vibrant and contestable civil culture 
within society. Its main success was scaring people into tranquillity 
and obedience. It even undermined the level of personal trust 
among people considerably. Since nobody knew exactly who was a 
member of such an organisation, potentially everybody could be. 73 
Thus, citizens would only dare to communicate their real opinions 
within a very narrow circle of friends or the family. 74 The media 
would report what the state wanted it to report and the part of the 
population able to receive Western TV channels in the former 
GDR, for example, would keep quite about it. 75 The cognitive 
dissonance arising from always being forced to separate one's 
official from one's unofficial opinions did not have any positive 
effect on people's standing in society and in any case it was not 
helpful in giving people a chance to learn the patterns of behaviour 
that are essential for the working of a free and democratic republic. 
Patterns of behaviour learned under conditions of fear and 
uncertainty are hard to be neutralised. In the case of the Ukraine 
these patterns might be traced back to the 1930s and 1940s when 
under Stalin millions of Ukrainians were shot, exiled, or 
incarcerated. 76 
However, I do not want to paint too pessimistic a picture with 
regard to the likelihood of changing informal institutions and the 
societal equilibrium of a country as a whole. If people realise that 
other forms of behaviour are more likely to support their well-
being, they will not be too reluctant to adopt them. This can happen 
by copying patterns that have proven to be successful for citizens in 
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other societies, for instance. Furthermore, the adoption of new 
formal institutions, such as the rule oflaw and contract 
enforcement, work as major driving forces for the kind of social 
evolution needed. However this adoption may occur, the process is 
bound to take time. Social norms cannot be sustained by 
instrumental reasoning alone - they have to be internalised, so that 
violating them is felt to be not just an ordinary mistake but 
something shameful. All that policy makers can do, given that they 
want to do something, is to provide an appropriate legal and social 
framework within which a new equilibrium supported by certain 
social norms and values can arise. 
Who is the Man? 
Although the political and economic environment has improved, 
the Ukrainian State has still not really left behind its parasitic 
equilibrium. So who is responsible for pushing the country onto a 
path that will lead to a better equilibrium and for keeping it on that 
path? "The people!" one is tempted to scream. Only when they 
demand a non-parasitic state, then it will develop towards that 
destination in the long run. For this to come true people have to 
stand up to the rights that are formally granted to them in the 
constitution. 77 
When Yushchenko, Ex-Prime Minister of the country and one of 
the most reform-minded leaders the Ukraine had seen after 
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independence, was voted out of office last year, only one thousand 
Ukrainians made the effort to demonstrate against his dismissal in 
Kiev. That was disappointing for all foreign observers and a slap in 
the face of freedom and democracy. 
Nevertheless, that lack of civility is explainable. Opposition has to 
be learned. Unlike other transition countries such as neighbouring 
Poland, Ukraine as part of the former Soviet Union did not have 
something like a state independent economical or political domain. 
Basically everybody and everything was under state control. In 
Poland, on the other hand, a substantial number of private 
businesses existed even under communist rule and agriculture was 
never collectivised. Furthermore, the civil opposition to the 
communist government in the form of Solidarity and the Catholic 
Church enjoyed enormous popularity long before 1989. And when 
Solidarity came to power, the new government was endowed with a 
much higher degree of trust than the government in CIS countries, 
which hardly saw any significant change in leadership. These 
differences in the institutional legacy of countries in transition need 
to be taken into account. 
Opening New Perspectives 
This does not mean that patterns of behaviour do not change. In 
order to mobilise people one needs a sufficient amount of 
independent information. The freedom of the media is, therefore, 
one of the crucial institutions that need to be fully established in the 
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Ukraine. Unfortunately, non-state media still face difficulties in 
providing unbiased information to the public and in operating free 
of governmental and financial pressure. Harassment, buyouts, and 
personal attacks on journalists were the rule during the last couple 
of years and have coerced the media into a submissive role. During 
the election campaign in 1999, for instance, 25 out of the 64 
member stations of the Ukrainian Radio Broadcasters Association 
reported that they had received anonymous threats or were harassed 
by tax authorities. The Government of the Ukraine exerted pressure 
on the media to keep the communist opposition off the air. 
Furthermore, the President of the country, his chief of staff, and the 
Interior Minister were accused of involvement in the 
disappearance, and possible murder, of the Ukrainian journalist 
Georgy Gongadze in November 2000, who was an outspoken critic 
of government corruption. 
Support of an independent media landscape in the Ukraine 
complemented by the spreading of information by foreign media 
can be helpful in strengthening the political awareness and self-
confidence of the Ukrainian people. Equally, exchange 
programmes can play an important role when it comes to opening 
different perspectives to people. 
What is encouraging is that a few Ukrainian-German agricultural 
exchange programmes exist. A good example is the German-
Ukrainian Agro Development and Investment Project (DUAP) that 
we visited in Vinnicia. Within the framework of this programme, 
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German agrarians, who experienced the restructuring of the East 
German agricultural sector, help to analyse Ukrainian farms and 
offer practical advice. German students of agricultural economics 
can also participate in these programmes, work on Ukrainian farms 
and get into contact with the people. On the other hand, Ukrainian 
farmers and students can visit agricultural enterprises in Germany 
and see what they like and what they do not like about them. Such 
exchange programmes do not only serve the exchange of 
knowledge and expertise; they also bring people together and 
create trust between them. Pure exchange of information can be 
useful, but if people really work together and overcome practical 
obstacles together, a proper foundation for future co-operation can 
be created. Foreign investors can give advice and make suggestions 
to improve or restructure, but solutions can only be found in co-
operation with the locals. 78 Only when local farmers participate in 
the establishment of restructuring programmes, will those 
programmes stand a chance to be implemented. As a result of such 
participation, the local farmers's sense of responsibility for the 
success of certain measures will be much stronger than under 
circumstances when outsiders just throw their programmes at them. 
The Role of International Institutions 79 
What is true in the particular area of agricultural assistance 
programmes also makes sense when we approach the grand 
political, economic and financial level. The simple transfer of 
ready-made programmes rarely works. Whether we like it or not, 
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not every country is happy to converge on the Anglo-American 
style of capitalism immediately. From this perspective I also see 
the international integration of the Ukraine. It seems to be 
conventional wisdom that liberalisation of trade and access to 
foreign exchange can be better sustained by multilateral 
commitments, which help to anchor these measures in well-
established institutions. In particular WTO accession, IMF Article 
VIII on currency convertibility and EU agreements on regional 
integration and free trade are expected to reduce the likelihood of 
policy reversals and are meant to add to the transparency and 
predictability of the respective trade and payment regimes. 
Commitments to these institutions might also contribute to the 
development of institutions in the country that support markets and 
private enterprises. But, of course, signing an agreement with the 
IMF does not necessarily signal strong commitment by 
governments to carry through the agreed policies. However, in the 
case ofthe states that were part of the Soviet Union, such 
commitments provide less impetus for reform than in countries 
such as Poland or Hungary. WTO negotiations are slow and due to 
the absence of prospects for closer integration in the near future, 
EU accession agreements have not exercised significant influence 
on the reform process in the CIS. Therefore, possibly the strongest 
anchor for liberalisation in this region is the commitment to the 
IMF under macroeconomic adjustment loans. However, IMF loans 
are an arbitrary development tool. On the one hand the Fund tries 
to convince governments to implement certain reforms with 
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economic arguments and by making loans dependent on the 
compliance with certain standards. Yet the various financial crises 
in the end of the 1990s have shown the other side of the coin: an 
IMF that apparently under much geo-political pressure (especially 
pressure from the U.S.)80 generously gives away credits and 
thereby, as "lender oflast resort", leads other lenders astray to take 
excessive lending risks. This often leads to weakened reform 
pressure, corruption, excessive debts and ultimately financial and 
economic crisis. 81 These incidents also illustrate that liberalisation, 
beyond a certain level and under adverse conditions, can have 
negative effects. This insight coincides with my considerations at 
the beginning of this work. The wisdom is not" the more 
liberalisation, the better", but to find the balance between 
regulation and control. Both over-regulation and the lack of 
regulation are bound to be sub-optimal for freedom and 
development. Moreover, policy makers and evaluators should focus 
increasingly on the quality ofliberalisation and regulation and not 
only on their quantity. 
Under the Clinton administration, for instance, the IMF and the 
World Bank pushed lots of countries in the direction of capital 
account liberalisation. Simultaneously, countries, which applied for 
credit, were "encouraged" to liberalise their current accounts: 
remove tariffs, import quotas, export subsidies, etc. The absence of 
comprehensive regulation allowed money to enter and to exit 
countries without any kind of control - and that is exactly what 
contributed immensely to the emergence of many financial crises. 
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Ownership and Conditionality 
Thus, liberalisation is a mixed blessing and its benefits will depend 
heavily on its implementation and the institutional history and 
circumstances of a country. There is simply no "one type suits all" 
recipe. The programmes initiated by international institutions will 
never be successful, if their "advisors" do not listen to the voices 
from the respective countries. 82 Only the citizens and experts of the 
respective country will be sufficiently familiar with the existing 
conditions and their history- and their input will therefore be an 
essential ingredient for any policy advice. Thus, governments and 
local experts need to participate in the formulation of development 
programmes. They need to experience a certain sense of 
"ownership" of them. Only if this is the case, will governments be 
sufficiently committed to implement the respective policy 
measures. Remember: one of the property effects that De So to 
points out is that property enhances the sense of responsibility and 
the accountability of the respective owner. That is not only true 
when it comes to assets but also when we consider ideas and plans. 
If it is my idea to go for a difficult hike or if I have at least happily 
agreed to undertake this mission, I will put much more effort to 
make things work than I would have if I had been forced into it. I 
will actively look for solutions when obstacles occur, I will learn 
from mistakes and I will be less likely to blame my fellows if 
things go wrong. That does not mean that lending institutions 
should not make their loans dependent on the compliance with 
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certain standards. Attaching conditions to borrowing does not have 
to conflict with the support of homegrown programmes. But 
programmes should encourage responsibility by allowing countries 
more room to set their own priorities. 
In the formulation of its Comprehensive Development 
Framework83, the World Bank made a step in the right direction, 
emphasising the partnerships among governments, donors, civil 
society, private donors and other development actors. According to 
this new conception the country which asks for help should be in 
the lead both "owning" and directing the development agenda, with 
the Bank and other partners each defining their support in their 
respective plans. There remain, of course, some practical 
challenges to this approach. The lack of capacity and confidence 
within countries, reluctant governments and nascent civil society 
organisations pose significant obstacles to the implementation of all 
good development resolutions. However, that should not stop 
international institutions from trying to broaden ownership in 
development programmes without compromising the level of 
debate or external development partners' participation in them. 
Increasing collaboration between the staff of lending institutions 
and experts in the respective country and stronger country 
involvement in upstream joint analytical work, even before policies 
and programmes are formulated, are perfectly reasonable goals. 
All these considerations do not deny that support from international 
lending institutions can play an important role in transition 
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countries. What is crucial, in my opinion, is that programmes are 
designed in co-operation with the respective country and that more 
attention is paid to their actual implementation. What the money is 
used for and how it is going to be channelled needs to be made 
transparent. During the 1990s, for instance, lots of stories circulated 
that IMF resources were simply passing through Russia briefly on 
their way to Swiss bank accounts. In providing loans to developing 
countries or to countries in transition, the Fund takes on a 
considerable level of responsibility. Thus, the transparency of its 
operations and the accountability of the Fund itself are crucial 
issues that are worth investigating and that need to be put to public 
debate. 
However, a country is always better off if it has more than one 
financial source on which to rely. Especially institutions that do not 
try to provide money directly to the government of a countrl\ but 
support specific development projects, are of utmost importance. 
These institutions usually interact with private institutions, 
encourage co-financing and foreign direct investment. Such activity 
is typical for projects financed by the EBRD, TACIS85, USAID86 
and some other World Bank projects. Furthermore, bilateral 
programmes supported by countries such as the UK (British Know 
How Fund), Germany, Canada, the Netherlands, etc., push 
development significantly. It is desirable that the various donors 
meet regularly to exchange information on joint activities and key 
developments and to co-ordinate their efforts. The EC Delegation 
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in Kiev, for instance, maintains regular dialogue with the IMF, the 
World Bank, the EBRD, IFC, UN bodies, the US, the Canadians 
and with the EU Member States' representatives. 
Most of these programmes are directed to the support of economic 
reform and private sector development but a considerable amount 
of resources is also devoted to such key issues as environmental 
problems, the adaptation of the Ukrainian health system to the 
needs of society87 and investment into education. Moreover, there 
exist various initiatives aiming at strengthening civil society in the 
country via NGO development and certain training and exchange 
programmes. In the field of education, the Tempus programme run 
by TACIS has made a promising start. It supports the development 
of the higher education system in Ukraine. The academic priorities 
cover international relations and European studies, law, economics 
and banking, environmental sciences in relation to energy and 
transport, agricultural studies and human resource management. 
The Monitoring Role of International Institutions 
What I am unambiguously positive about is the monitoring role that 
international institutions can play. The IMF, the World Bank, the 
EBRD and all the other institutions I have mentioned release 
annual reports that evaluate developments and policy strategies in 
the respective countries. 88 This monitoring activity is of course not 
completely altruistic. It is in the very interest of foreign donors to 
obtain as much information about the conditions in a country where 
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they want to invest their money. That should be a strong incentive 
for them to investigate the political and economic climate of the 
respective country properly. Complemented by the results of 
surveys made by Transparency International, the Carter Centre and 
Freedom House, these reports offer a fairly reliable source of 
information that is useful not only to potential foreign investors but 
also to the citizens of the respective country. The information 
publicised in these reports provides a useful tool for scrutinising 
state action, holding governments accountable to their 
commitments and for stimulating public debate. Thereby, these 
reports can contribute to an enhanced level of certainty with regard 
to government policies and the economic environment and 
consequently the creation of trust within and outside society. 
For this to happen, it is of course, necessary that these reports are 
widely available to the public. Due to the underdeveloped 
telecommunication infrastructure of the country, only a small part 
of the population has access to the Internet and to the relevant 
national and international web pages. 89 Another point is that reports 
should be made available in Ukrainian or Russian in order to be 
understood by Ukrainians interested in them. 
Progress in Privatisation - the Agro-Monopolies Privatisation 
Project90 
Foreign privatisation consulting has been important for the country. 
That is not changed by the fact that some mistakes have been made 
in the process. The project of privati sing the enterprises and assets 
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of a country where basically everything was owned by the state is 
new and challenging. And- as mentioned several times already-
privatisation is not just a "laudable" goal in itself. It only changes 
the legal status of an enterprise. In order to reap its benefits, 
managers have to change their patterns of behaviour, restructure 
their enterprises and find new ways of interacting with their 
suppliers and customers. 
A successful privatisation project is the Ukraine Agro-Monopolies 
Privatisation Project and in particular its elevator privatisation 
component. It demonstrates that both co-operations between 
different donor organisations and co-operation between such 
organisations and local institutions can be effective. 
I have mentioned before that the Ukrainian food processing 
industry and the marketing sector were highly uncompetitive. In 
particular, grain marketing was considered to be of"strategic" 
importance by the government and even if privatisation took place, 
the state insisted on keeping a significant percentage of the 
respective enterprise shares. Especially worrisome was the 
monopolistic position ofKhlib Ukrainy, the state agent for the 
purchase of grain and the distribution of inputs and the legal 
successor to the former Ministry for Grain Storage and Supply. It 
was given the outright ownership to one hundred of the countries 
best grain elevators including the important port elevators at 
Odessa and Mykolaev. Furthermore it controlled dozens of other 
strategically important grain storage and processing facilities. 
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Only in late 1997 did the government finally respond to the 
repeated nagging from international donor and private investor 
communities to reorganise and privatise the grain storage industry. 
Under these conditions US AID financed the Mass Privatisation 
Project under which PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), a well-known 
Washington Consulting Practice, provided the Ukrainian State 
Property Fund (SPF) with methodological and informational 
assistance in the privatisation process.91 The main objectives of the 
initiative were the privatisation of Ukraine's grain elevators and the 
de-monopolisation of para-statal organisations in the agricultural 
sector that threatened the development of a private and competitive 
agricultural market - that meant especially the de-monopolisation 
ofKhlib Ukrainy. 
PwC helped to draft the Cabinet ofMinisters Resolution 1218 "On 
the immediate acceleration of the privatisation of grain storage 
and grain processing enterprises" and negotiated the terms under 
which certain grain elevators would be privatised while Khlib 
Ukrainy would retain others. Throughout the project, PwC 
consultants tried to provide objective reporting on privatisation to 
the international donor community and particularly to the World 
Bank and the IMF and thereby enhanced the transparency of the 
process considerably. 
From 1996 to 1998 the World Bank's Enterprise Development 
Adjustment Loan was crucial for initiating and accelerating the 
privatisation process. This loan contained, among other things, the 
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first targets on the privatisation of grain elevators (300 grain-
marketing and distribution enterprises to be privatised to 70 per 
cent). These targets have been met. 
From 1998 to 1999 the IMF played the leading role among donor 
organisations in terms of privatisation- but a lot of its set targets 
have not been fulfilled. 92 
Additionally, project consultants advised U.S. and Ukrainian 
officials of the Gore-Kuchma Commission on Trade and 
Investment on progress in achieving the privatisation objectives 
agreed on in 1996. At this time the Ukrainian government had 
made a commitment to the Commission to fully privatise all but 
I 00 of the countries 543 grain-elevators. 
PwC also worked together with the Ukrainian Antimonopoly 
Committee (AMC). It drafted procedures for the restructuring of 
agro-industrial holding companies and gave various 
recommendations regarding the establishment of grain storage co-
operatives and conducted training seminars for AMC officials on 
privatisation and de-monopolisation. 
In the short period between November 1998 until June 1999 PwC 
consultants conducted twelve privatisation and corporate 
governance seminars for more than four hundred people in eight 
oblasts. Seminars focused on property registration, free transfer of 
shares to grain suppliers, tender regulation, and attraction of 
foreign investment, shareholder rights and corporate structures.93 
The participants of these seminars included the management of 
joint stock companies, representatives of state organisations that 
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were involved in the privatisation process and finally the 
shareholders of grain elevators such as fanners. In addition to these 
training seminars project consultants also provided direct enterprise 
assistance to dozens of grain elevators in Odessa, Poltova, Kiev and 
Lviv.94 
Last but not least, PwC has created the web site of the State 
Property Fund with USAID support. This web site provides up-to-
date information on share-sales, privatisation procedures and 
relevant legislation for everybody who is interested and has access 
to the Internet. Additionally one can find SPF reports that 
demonstrate government's progress in meeting the privatisation 
targets established by the donor community. Thereby it provides a 
good instrument to keep people95 informed about what is going on 
and gives them a tool to hold their government accountable to its 
promises and commitments. 
Through all these efforts the elevator privatisation programme can 
be considered one of the successes of Ukrainian agricultural 
reform. 96 One of its main objectives - the de-monopolisation of 
Khlib Ukrainy- has been largely met.97 This, in turn, is beneficial 
for the farmers who can now freely choose their suppliers and do 
not have to fear as much arbitrary state interference as before. 
The positive role international donors can play is illustrated nicely 
by this example. Through the funding of specific projects, through 
strategic and legal advise, they can incentivate the government, 
managers and potential investors to reorganise both the regulatory 
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setting and enterprise structures in a manner that allows market 
forces to work for the benefit of all. 
Furthermore, in the Final Report, Kevin Covert - the leader of the 
project- remarks that he learned from it that "economic reform 
targets [need to] be concrete, measurable, agreed in writing with 
Government officials and linked directly to donor funding". He 
considers it to be highly doubtful that government officials would 
have embarked on the relatively aggressive schedule for the 
privatisation of grain elevators set by the project had not, for 
instance, the IMF particularly insisted on it. Thus, the "locking-in" 
mechanism provided by government commitments to foreign 
lending institutions could be a strong complement to the various 
consulting initiatives provided. 
Civic Activism 
USAID has contributed to the growth of civic activism in the 
country. Civic watchdog groups like the Committee of Voters of 
Ukraine, community based anti-corruption partnerships in Donetsk 
and Lviv, and the Freedom of Choice Coalition have received 
support both through financial help and training programmes. 
TV, radio, and print professionals have received USAID- supported 
training in business management and investigative journalism. 98 
Furthermore, another programme provides lawyers or legal advice 
to journalists and media outlets when they face politically 
motivated libel suits, licensing restrictions or other problems. The 
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same programme works with judges, lawyers, and journalists to 
raise their awareness of Ukrainian and European Media law. 
Anti-Corruption Initiative/9 
One ofUSAID's special initiatives is the Anti-Corruption 
programme. By informing people about their rights, supporting 
efforts to have those rights upheld and publicising examples of 
successful cases of citizens defending their rights, the organisation 
hopes to generate greater expectations among citizens that corrupt 
officials should be accountable under the law. Two pilot 
programmes have been established in Lviv and Donetsk by 
Management Systems International (MSI), a USAID contractor, to 
promote strong partnerships between local governments, NGOs, 
business and media. The goals of the initiative are the combat of 
corruption, stimulation of economic growth, improvement of the 
investment and social climate and the enhancement of good 
government practices. The Public Independent Committee Against 
Corruption in Lviv and the Partnership for Integrity in Donetsk are 
said to represent a broad constituency from civil society and the 
private sector. They are expected to work in close co-ordination 
with the oblast and municipal administrations on concrete activities 
aimed at reducing or preventing corruption. The simplification and 
streamlining of procedures that reduce bureaucratic discretion and 
opportunities for bribery is considered to be crucial. Moreover, 
public awareness campaigns highlight citizen rights to government 
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services and provide legal advice to citizens and business people 
through Citizens' Advocacy Offices, which run a 24-hour hotline. 
MSI representatives visit the respective cities several times a year 
to provide technical assistance, assessment and oversight. 
According to USAID the initiative has helped to improve the 
business environment considerably. In 2000 a U.S.-British venture 
decided to invest over US$ 65 million in a sunflower processing 
plant in Donetsk stating that the extensive anti-corruption campaign 
conducted there had increased its confidence. But of course, such 
reports are only partially useful and it is pretty hard to check the 
"real" success of certain initiatives. What remains true, however, is 
that there is a strong link between the intensity of regulation and 
corruption. Much is won if authorities do not interfere in matters 
that are none of their business and the administrative process is 
simplified. If programmes pursue these goals, they are likely to 
contribute to an improvement of the situation. 
Civil Society and NGO Development100 
Even though all these initiatives have their positive effects, it is 
hard to evaluate them properly. The significance of the whole civil 
society issue, for instance, is highly controversial. 
The concept might imply citizen's knowledge of their rights and 
responsibilities and their ability and willingness to defend those 
rights and to fulfil those responsibilities. But in another sense it is 
also used to demand pluralism through broad citizen participation 
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in non-governmental and informal activities or a balance of power 
between citizens and the state. 
I have no doubt that formal democracy, characterised by press 
freedom and reliable expectation of non-rigid and regular elections 
is absolutely central to economic modernisation and sustainable 
growth. It is another question, however, whether a so-called "deep" 
democracy, i.e., a mode of government in which consensus 
amongst organised interest groups, including municipal bodies and 
labour unions, is taken as a necessary aspect of policy choice. 
Some of the NGOs that are praised so widely might represent 
interest groups that are narrowly focused. If they can wield their 
power by threatening vetoes if they do not get their rents, that could 
be rather counterproductive for sustained development. 
Although growing activity of the NGO sector might be a sign of a 
more vibrant civil society, one must not equate NGO activism with 
a strong civil society. In the Ukraine, for example, the public is 
largely unaware and generally disinterested in NGO activities. 
A Non Governmental Organisation is ordinarily defined as a non-
profit association of citizens that operates independently of 
government or business structures. It is expected to bring citizen 
concerns to the government, to monitor government policies and to 
encourage political participation. However, in the case of the 
Ukrainian NGOs, it is important to realise that the structure of 
many is still highly centralised and personalised leadership 
structures are common. Furthermore, transparency seems to be a 
foreign concept for most of them. Members of such organisations 
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often consider the disclosure of information concerning their 
operations and finances to the public as a rather unreasonable 
demand. While it is true that the threat of potential harassment by 
tax authorities and criminal elements is real, organisations also 
refuse to be accountable to the public because of cultural legacies 
of the Soviet era. So far there is simply no culture of openness and 
accountability for the use of public funds. There is hardly any 
understanding on the part ofNGOs that the benefits they receive as 
public organisations are largely at the expense of taxpayers, and 
that this alone is a sufficient justification for transparency. 
Thus, similar to their governmental counterparts, NGOs face 
incompetence and corruption. Additionally, different NGOs tend 
not to work together - even though they might have the same 
objectives. Information is hardly shared and often enough the main 
worry is to outbid other NGOs when it comes to foreign funding. 
Another worrisome phenomenon is the tendency of local 
administrators or deputies to start up their own NGOs or get 
employees to register in NGOs in order to ensure their departments 
are adequately funded or can demonstrate relationships with NGOs 
while still maintaining full control of programming, initiative, and 
funding. Needless to say, such conditions are not beneficial for any 
kind of independent monitoring! Thus, the increase in NGO 
activity does not necessarily strengthen the development of a 
stronger civil society. In many ways it seems that the NGO sector 
largely repeats the structural deficiencies of the governmental 
sector, does not balance the power of the state and has not actually 
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had any significant beneficial influence on government action so 
far. Consequently, foreign donors have to be rather careful as to 
where they will direct their resources. A certain degree of 
conditionality and the coherent introduction and implementation of 
international accounting and financial reporting standards are 
crucial. 
Implications 
The transformation of a transition country like the Ukraine is a 
complicated and time-consuming process. After only ten years it 
cannot be expected to be complete. 101 
Supporting this process means supporting it honestly and for a long 
time on all levels and in a sufficiently regulated manner. Policy 
consulting and advice from foreign experts, especially legal advice 
that takes into account the respective economic background is 
valuable. These projects can fail, of course, when foreign advisors 
have the wrong incentives. But the same is more often true for their 
Ukrainian counterparts. However, admitting that certain projects 
can be performed in a bad manner or that they do not always have a 
significant effect does not render them useless. In many cases 
foreign investment and policy consulting have been very beneficial 
and have pushed the development of specific sectors in the right 
direction. Technical assistance has been very helpful. In Kiev, for 
instance, the Germans have put up a banking academy, a bakery 
and a butchery school that provide Ukrainians with the opportunity 
to benefit from Western Know-How. As mentioned above, I am in 
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favour of all sorts of exchange programmes whether they may be 
among schools, universities, or companies. This should be the most 
effective way to make people familiar with the new technologies, 
standards and institutions they might want to apply in their country 
without patronising them. With regard to this, it is rather 
unfortunate that it is still very difficult for Ukrainian students to 
study in Western Europe and that only a small amount ofWestem 
students are adventurous enough to study in the "Wild East". But 
all beginnings are difficult and there is a good chance that the 
success of exchange programmes will encourage more people to 
join them, especially when the respective governments simplify 
their administrative obstacle curses somewhat. 102 However, this 
practice will only bear fruit in the long run. 
Despite all the negative aspects I have discussed, the Ukraine might 
have found at least the right runway on its search for freedom and 
development. Since Independence in 1991, a new generation of 
politicians and businessmen has grown that might be able to change 
the "old rules of the game". In 2000, the real GDP growth of the 
country was 5.8 per cent and in 2001 it even amounted to 8 per 
cent. Real wages rose by 20 per cent last year and the inflation rate 
that once happened to be around I 0,000 per cent has dropped to an 
annual rate of 6 per cent. 103 The stabilisation of the economy is 
very likely to contribute to the overall development of the country. 
Entrepreneurs and businessmen have started to realise the 
economic potential in the official sector of the economy: new jobs 
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will be created, tax revenues will increase and more funding will be 
available to finance both the social security and the educational 
system. 
In March 2002, the new Ukrainian Parliament will be elected and 
so far competition among the different parties appears to be 
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expected that this competition will lead to the election of a 
government that is checked and balanced by a range of different 
political forces. 
Without a doubt, the conditions for the development of a free and 
prosperous society are not ideal -but they have improved. There 
are still many obstacles in the way, but people now recognise these 
obstacles as such and want to overcome them. When the people in 
the country are willing to change their circumstances, when they 
dare to take the responsibilities that come with freedom, then they 
will use some of the tools that foreign advisors are offering to them 
for removing the obstacles to development. 
A free agent - whether it is an individual, a firm, or a state - is not 
necessarily somebody who fights heroically alone against the rest 
of the world. Freedom does not presuppose ultimate independence 
- neither at the individual, nor at the national or global level. The 
emphasis on independence makes sense only when we want to 
distance ourselves from the kind of oppressive dependency existing 
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under coercive regimes, which do not allow an agent to invent 
herself in accordance with her ideas of a good life. 
The ability to learn from each other is one of humanity's most 
precious assets and the precondition for any kind of progress. This 
includes both learning from other agents' mistakes and looking for 
new solutions. 105 
Freedom and development allow for - or rather demand - co-
operation and mutual help. Well-designed and regulated foreign 
assistance can offer many new opportunities to a country -
opportunities the people of this country can choose from and 
develop in their own specific context. They can help to pilot a 
country to the right runway and support it so that it does not lose its 
way again. 
C. Recapitulation 
Back to Theory! 
After giving this detailed account of developments in the Ukraine, I 
would like to close the circle of this work by returning to the 
theoretical framework. I started off with describing two influential 
liberal theories - one by Amartya Sen and the other by F .A. Hayek. 
While the work of the latter is usually subsumed under the category 
of classical liberalism, Sen's capabilities approach is often 
associated with the concept of deep democracy. For both authors 
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individual freedom is of utmost importance. It is both a political 
value and the precondition for development. 
If we compare the approaches of Hayek and Sen, we have to keep 
in mind that their ideas arose under different circumstances. While 
Hayek's Constitution of Liberty was written in the late fifties in the 
United States, Sen wrote Development as Freedom in the late 
nineties mainly inspired by empirical studies in developing 
countries. This difference in time and space might explain some of 
the basic differences in their respective theories. 
The American Constitution is Hayek's prime example of an 
institution embedded in the rule oflaw. The United States has been 
established on the liberal principals that are expressed in this 
constitution and never really deviated from them. The only threat to 
their equilibrium in the fifties was probably seen in the ghost of 
communism haunting the capitalist world. It is understandable that 
political liberalists at this time were especially wary of socialist 
practices such as the compulsory redistribution of income. Hayek's 
opposition to socialism might have also led him to argue so sharply 
against the idea of"design" in society. 106 In that he opposes the 
"the crude rationalism of the socialist, who wants to reconstruct all 
social institutions according to a pattern prescribed by his 
individual reason". 107 However, his general aversion to any form of 
creeping administrative discretion is probably more significant in 
that respect. 
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In the context of developing or, for our purpose, transition 
countries, however, the situation is different. Socialism is in its last 
gasps in the world - coping with its legacies is the challenging task 
that remains. Liberal principals have to be (re-) introduced in 
former socialist countries. The introduction of these principles does 
not happen in a vacuum. One has to take into account history and 
has to work on the initial conditions, including the already 
established institutions 108, in the respective country. People have to 
be convinced of the merits of a liberal society. They have been 
assured for decades that the way of life they led under socialism 
was the right one and they had arranged their lives in accordance 
with the perceived circumstances. Whatever Western theorists 
might wish to think, people in socialist countries did value the lives 
the system allowed them to lead - whatever role one considers 
adaptive preference formation to have played. 
After the breakdown of communism, people have to feel 
sufficiently secure before they will accept major changes. It is not 
easy to go from one path of development to another. There are 
many intermediate steps on the way. History does not jump. A 
liberal society has to evolve gradually and it is bound to be 
different from those societies found in the Anglo-American world 
for quite a while. 
The difference between Hayek's and Sen's approach to freedom is 
the following: While Hayek's approach to individual liberty is 
mainly concerned with the processes that allow freedom of action 
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and choice, Sen puts considerable emphasis on the actual 
opportunities that people have to choose, given their personal and 
social circumstances. The question is if this difference is of a 
fundamental nature or is merely a shift of emphasis. 
For Hayek justice is inherent in the rules of the law. But the rule of 
law is of a higher order and transcends our articulation abilities. 
Thus it must, for the greatest part, remain in the procedures, which 
express it. Therefore, Hayek is reluctant to specify individual rights 
in a more substantive way. His scepticism concerning the 
expressability of the rules of justice, norms and rights also shows 
itself in his attitude towards the role of public political discourse. 
For him institutions, including social norms and values, evolve 
spontaneously and any deliberate attempt to (re)-form them- and 
with them society- is met with some reservation. However, Hayek 
writes within a context in which institutions such as a free press 
and free speech are already well established and internalised. 
Within such a framework values, ideas and norms continuously 
adapt and needs are conceptualised or re-formulated. But if these 
institutions are lacking or are still very weak, confidence in them 
and in people's ability to participate in the political process needs 
to be created actively. This is especially important because these 
institutions provide efficient tools for monitoring the work of other 
institutions and for holding politicians accountable to their 
commitments. Although Sen would probably recognise the 
difficulties that will arise in any attempt to reform the institutions 
of a given country, he puts great emphasis on the role of public 
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debate and political participation for the conceptualisation of 
certain needs, values and rights. Only if rights and freedoms are 
formulated, then the political process will be sufficiently 
transparent and policy makers can be held accountable to them. 
While Hayek points out that the political process tends to favour 
existing powerful groups, Sen emphasises that open public 
discussion is likely to reduce the power of special interest groups. 
This is of course only the case if people are enjoying the 
substantive freedoms that enable them to take part in the process. 
In the context of the Ukraine both the demand for procedural 
justice and the formulation and support of substantive freedoms or 
capabilitities are crucial. The rule of law must establish rules that 
fulfil Hayek's formal conditions- they must be abstract and 
general, known and certain and apply equally to everybody 
independently of their position. Even if the complete fulfilment of 
these conditions is an ideal and not fully achievable in practice, 
they largely prevent the granting of exemptions and privileges, and 
therefore, most forms of rent-seeking behaviour. These rules are to 
be combined with the establishment of a formal property system. 
The institution of private property enhances the responsibility and 
accountability of economic agents and delimits the scope of 
individual liberty. What we found in the Ukraine was a network of 
non-transparent, arbitrary and often retrospective regulation that 
inhibits competition and opens vast opportunities for the abuse of 
bureaucratic discretionary powers. This system has been supported 
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by unclear property and responsibility structures in business and 
politics. 
I have described the phenomenon of ubiquitous arbitrary regulation 
with regard to trade-barriers, taxation, subsidies, the 
implementation of bankruptcy laws and the social security system. 
In all these areas, regulation has not fulfilled its purpose of 
enhancing the certainty of agents in their political and economic 
environment. It has been unreliable, full of contradictions and 
subject to constant change. Regulation and state interference have 
coerced citizens in arbitrary ways and prevented them from 
exercising the rights formally granted to them in the constitution, 
rather than promoting the general welfare of society. That also 
includes measures that seemed to be beneficial at first sight such as 
the provision of subsidies to producers and consumers. In the case 
of subsidisation of state owned enterprises via credits, tax write-
offs and preferential administrative treatment in the first years of 
transition, the private sector was subjected to a higher tax-burden to 
finance the respective subsidies and inhibit competition. Thus the 
privileges granted to one group resulted in discrimination against 
another. Complicated standardisation and certification procedures 
for newcomers worsened the situation. This created an enormous 
entry barrier to new businesses, reduced opportunities of job 
creation and prevented state enterprises from the necessary 
restructuring that would have been the precondition for efficiency 
and profit making. Thus the granting of favours and exemptions 
that contradicts Hayek's requirement for procedural justice, has 
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driven whole sectors of the economy to the verge of ruin and 
reduced the general welfare of society. Furthermore, the monopoly 
provision of certain services by the state forced citizens into a 
position of dependency and inhibited their development as 
responsible agents and consequently the progress of the country. 
The subsidisation of the social sphere of enterprises, for instance, 
prevented employees from looking for new employment 
opportunities and led them to oppose restructuring. 
Additionally, the arbitrary character of regulations does not allow 
for the "spontaneous" evolution of beneficial institutions. Hayek 
described the task of the lawgiver as the creation of conditions in 
which an orderly arrangement can establish and ever renew itself. 
In this respect, the Ukrainian government has clearly failed for the 
part since independence. 
On the other hand it is important to realise that resistance to 
arbitrary and coercive regulation was largely prevented because 
people were lacking the basic capabilities to stand up for their 
rights. Often they would not even be sufficiently informed about 
the scope and content of their rights - which was of course in the 
interest of rent-seekers and outright criminals, who capitalised on 
this ignorance. The breakdown of the Soviet Union led the country 
into tremendous economic recession. The fear of unemployment 
and income deprivation in general and the resulting uncertainty 
about the future left people weak. Old norms and value systems 
were carried over into the "new" system, since there had not been 
enough time for the formulation or evolution of new ones. 
117 
Here Sen's capability approach kicks in- the combination and 
mutual enforcement of political freedoms, economic facilities, 
social opportunities, transparency guarantees and protective 
security, which allow people to choose a life they have reason to 
value. These freedoms go beyond pure procedural justice and the 
demand for formal democracy, which is mainly embedded in the 
set of political freedoms and transparency guarantees. They are 
meant to empower citizens to become responsible agents -
confident about their ability to exercise their rights, to invent 
themselves and to influence their surroundings. 
The creation of an efficient social security system, for instance, has 
been regarded as crucial for the Ukraine. Since the emphasis is put 
on the responsible and free agent, it cannot be realised by consumer 
subsidies that support irresponsible attitudes, cause inefficiencies 
and do not encourage people to take their destiny into their own 
hands. The goal is substantial direct support to those in need 
combined with an efficient social insurance system. Means testing 
is an essential part of the kind of income support envisaged and 
will reduce state expenses, distort incentives as little as possible 
and fight irresponsible behaviour. 
These demands are well in line with Hayek's recommendations in 
the third part of The Constitution of Liberty. In his view, 
competing types of welfare provision, may it be in the field of 
public health, unemployment support or education, are likely to 
increase the efficiency of these services. In the area of 
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unemployment provision Hayek wants the state to provide only a 
uniform minimum for those who are unable to maintain 
themselves. Any further provision should be left to competitive and 
voluntary efforts. Furthermore, if these services are offered by a 
variety of suppliers, the state monopoly of their provision will 
break down; the state's coercive power will be reduced and 
opportunities for rent-seeking will decrease significantly. The 
limitation of state power is especially important for the provision of 
education. Hayek acknowledges the need for compulsory basic 
education, but he also argues that compulsory education or even 
government-financed education does not require that educational 
institutions need to be run by the government. Competition among 
·different providers will enhance the quality of the respective 
educational services and will lower the dangers associated with the 
transmission of societal values by one single institution. Thus, on 
the whole, government is obliged to secure basic education for all 
but it should, if possible, not be too involved with the actual 
education beyond a certain regulatory level. All of this is perfectly 
consistent with Sen's capabilities approach. 
In the postscript of The Constitution of Liberty, Hayek admits that 
he dislikes many of the measures he tries to delimit in the third part 
of his book. However, he goes on to say: 
"But, though I may dislike some of the measures concerned as 
much as they [the conservatives] do and might vote against them, I 
know of no general principles to which I could appeal to pursuade 
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those of a different view that those measures are not permissible in 
the general kind of society which we both desire. "109 
Hayek does not really rejoice about the blessings of the welfare 
state- he rather argues for their limitation- but he is also aware of 
the fact that he, as a liberal, does not know all the answers and that 
his answers are not necessarily the right ones. Additionally, he 
knows that certain services once introduced to society cannot easily 
be taken away from its citizens again. Thus, Hayek admits that 
protective security can and has evolved as a value in society. 
What does that mean? Once a theorist admits any role for a certain 
measure, her theory will not allow her to set a non-arbitrary 
maximum level on its provision. Once the role of protective 
security has been acknowledged it is a matter of public choice to 
delimit its role and consequently the scope of the welfare state. 
Thus both Hayek and Sen support the provision of facilities that 
enable people to access medical care, education and basic income 
support. Both agree that the provisions made must not deliver 
ready-made solutions, but rather encourage the individual to take 
her destiny into her hands and to look actively for solutions to her 
problems. Welfare provisions are meant to enable the individual to 
act responsibly and not to take responsibility away from her. 
In comparing the approaches of Sen and Hayek it is quite 
interesting that Hayek, in his attempt to delimit the provision of 
supporting services, gives a more detailed account of the kind of 
implementation that he envisages than Sen. As somebody who does 
care about the developments and processes going on in society he 
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can hardly avoid becoming a bit more concrete about certain issues 
than the liberal language of purely procedural terms would allow 
him to do. The formulation of substantive freedoms and rights is 
important for their implementation and defence, even if we 
acknowledge that they might change over time. 
Reconciliation 
While Sen is relatively eloquent in listing development goals and 
substantive freedoms, he does not inaugurate to us who might be 
responsible for the just implementation of these freedoms and what 
measures would be available to delimit administrative discretion. In 
his view, the reinforcement of substantive freedoms and democratic 
debate seem to be magical tools that prevent society from rent-
seeking and other forms of power abuse. However, it is hard to buy 
into that optimism- and Hayek certainly does not. Somebody- or 
rather something - has to guard the guardians. And that is the rule 
of law and its embeddednes in the various societal institutions. 
Hayek's and Sen's approaches are not opposed to each other. They 
merely put different emphasis on the procedural and substantive 
aspects of freedom. It needs to be clear that Sen neither denies the 
importance of the rule of law nor leaves it out of consideration, but 
he does not allow an over-arching principle to constrain his set of 
instrumental freedoms. The rule oflaw just appears as a sub-
element on his list of vector-components comprising freedom. In a 
sense it is understandable that he cannot attribute an "over-arching" 
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role to one kind of freedom. To him all the freedoms he lists are 
valuable in themselves. However, we must not conceive of the rule 
of law as just one other kind of freedom. For Hayek the rule of law 
is an enabling condition for all freedoms. Nowhere in Development 
as Freedom does Sen say anything to confute this. Thus there is no 
obvious reason why he should not accept Hayek's reasoning. 
If Sen's approach is to be applied practically, an over-arching 
maximisation constraint on his complicated development project is 
necessary, otherwise doors will be left open for bureaucratic 
discretion and the dangers associated with it. Conflicts of interest 
arise within society because different people tend to care about 
different things. If a state tries to maximise complex development 
objectives, then bureaucrats, who are concerned with these 
objectives, might be tempted to abuse their discretionary powers 
and engage in rent-seeking and corruption. The arbitrary regulation 
and coercion that comes with these activities make society less free 
and impede development and growth. The respect for the rule of 
law in society is restraining discretionary powers and the negative 
effects that the actions performed by one group or agent can have 
on the freedoms of other people. 
Thus, if Sen would allow Hayek's master-principle as a binding, 
governing constraint on the maximisation of his capabilities-vector, 
this would strengthen his theory considerably. Simultaneously, a 
corrective reading of Sen's and Hayek's approaches would save the 
latter from the charge that he has nothing to say that is relevant to 
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development as opposed to a sound constitutional order in an 
already mature democracy. The resulting theoretical framework 
allows us to describe development goals and point out certain 
shortcomings and inconsistencies in the policies and institutional 
arrangements of a given country. In the case ofthe Ukraine we 
have seen that development has not only been inhibited by the 
neglect of certain instrumental freedoms and rights but also by the 
lack of solid institutions that incorporate the rule of law or 
procedural justice. We have seen that both over-regulation and 
under-regulation, as subsets of arbitrary regulation, impede 
development. A balance has to be found between these extremes. 
The implementation of political philosophy, however, is always an 
uncertain business and is likely to be inhibited by mis-
interpretations and practical obstacles. Yet this does not detract 
from the role it can play in encouraging people to think and to 
scrutinise what is going on in society. Philosophy helps us to put 
our criticism into arguments, teaches us to find inconsistencies and 
encourages debate. This, to my mind, is one of the most effective 
weapons for the defence of freedom - freedom understood both in 
terms of the absence of arbitrary coercion and the freedom to 
choose a life one has reason to value. 
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Postscript 
The elections that were held on 31 March 2002 led to mixed 
results. The Kuchma block won the most seats, but failed to 
achieve an overwhelming majority. Opposition parties, such as 
Yushchenko's party, managed to get into parliament. Thus, 
President Kuchma's powers will be more restrained in the future. 
However, the election process has been far from fair. Opposition 
candidates have been threatened 1 and found it hard to get a fair 
hearing on state television. 
The main question is what the winners will do with their victory. 
The bureaucracy of the country is still unreformed and despite the 
significant economic growth in 2001, living standards in the 
Ukraine remain very low. 
1 The Economist found it worthwhile to point out that only one candidate was 
murdered in this years elections. See The Economist, April61h- lth 2002, 
p.29 
1 Ludwig Striewe is also a member of the German Advisory Group with 
the Ukrainian Government in Kiev. 
2 F.A. Hayek: The Constitutions of Liberty, p. 37 
3 I am assuming that these rules and norms have evolved particularly to 
cope with the limits of human rationality due to informational and 
cognitive constraints. However, even without such constraints we would 
need rules and norms because of co-ordination problems. 
4 According to Douglas C. North institutions are the formal and 
informal rules that shape human interaction by structuring incentives 
in exchange (political, social or economic). 
On the evolution of institutions see Ken Binmore: Game Theory And 
The Social Contract Volume 2: Just Playing. 
5 F.A Hayek: The Constitution of Liberty, p. 37 
6 
"Choosing a life one has reason to value" might sound somewhat 
metaphysical. However, I think Sen qualifies this notion sufficiently 
by explaining the interconnections among freedoms and especially 
by pointing out the necessity of public discussion and education as 
means to avoid adaptive preference formation. The term adaptive 
preference formation describes the phenomenon that individuals adjust 
their desires to the way of life they know. That is, of course, not 
necessarily a bad thing. When I was small, for instance, I was 
absolutely determined to become a queen later in life. But realising that 
this was not going to happen however hard I would try, I gave up on 
this idea. Seen in this way, adaptive preference formation is a basic 
means to keep one's sanity. However, what people like Sen or Jon Elster 
have in mind when they talk about this are cases in which people are 
prevented from aspiring to goals such as political equality, a certain 
level of education and material well being. The mechanism of dissonance 
reduction, by adapting one's preferences to the perceived circumstances, 
prevents people from changing these circumstances although this might be 
perfectly feasible. Thus, their capability of"inventing" themselves and 
consequently their freedom are severely constrained. 
7 In Sen's conception an agent is someone who acts and brings about 
change and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values. 
8 In a sense, we cannot really talk about the "trade-offs" between 
Sen's instrumental freedoms since each of them is valuable in itself 
9 F.A. Hayek: The Constitution of Liberty, p. 206 
10 F.A. Hayek: The Constitution of Liberty, p. 207-209 
11 F.A. Hayek: The Constitution of Liberty, p. 40 
12 According to As lund, in the 1990s the number of enterprise inspections 
was possibly the highest in the world, at least they were requiring 
more management time than anywhere else. 
13 They would often earn their bribes by blocking laws that aimed 
at deregulation. 
14 In 1996 a new stable currency (hryvnia) was introduced. Before that, 
the Ukraine had an interim currency (karbovanents). 
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15The principal-agent model can be applied to the wearing-out of 
Soviet-style planned economies. The skilful non-fulfilment of the 
centrally posed plan has been the optimal strategy for agents 
(collectives, enterprises, etc.), to minimise their costs (work) and 
to maximise their yields (time, "additional incomes"). 
Such opportunistic behaviour led to incurable inefficiencies. 
16 Implying both transparent and enforceable property rights 
and responsibility structures 
17 Hernando DeSoto: The Mystery of Capital, p. 69-62 
18 Transaction costs are the operating costs (beyond the price of the purchase) 
of conducting a transaction, whether those costs are money, time, or 
inconvenience. 
19 Quoted in Policies and Agricultural Development in Ukraine, p. 29 
20 Policies and Agricultural Development in Ukraine, p. 29 
21 
"Law on Collective Agricultural Enterprises" 1992 
22 The whole issue ofland distribution is highly problematic, especially 
because until today the country has not managed to establish a land registry 
system. 
23 
minimum export prices for goods subject to export restriction 
24 Presidential Decree "On Urgent Measures for Accelerating Reformation of 
the Agrarian Sector of the Economy" 
25 The following consideration do not only apply to the agricultural sector of 
the economy but are relevant in general. 
26 These functions are in accordance with the property effects described by 
DeSoto. 
27 The Antimonopoly Committee is an exception. Its activities are made public 
in annual reports and it issues relatively clear injunctions and rulings. 
Unfortunately its powers are restricted when it comes to the activities of many 
state enterprises which have sufficient connections to political decision-
makers in Kiev. 
28 Even after this moratorium, individuals will not be allowed to own more than 
100 hectare ofland until the year 2010. Moreover, foreign physical persons 
and legal entities cannot own agricultural land. 
29 Income through leasing payments and sales revenues would become an option 
in addition to the common subsistence farming of household plots. 
3° For instance, they can use the threat of unemployment or exclusion from the 
social sphere when somebody refuses to sell their land at a low price. 
31 Land Code, Chapter 5: Land of Agricultural Purpose; Article 22/4: Land of 
agricultural purpose may not be transferred in ownership to foreign citizens, 
stateless individuals and foreign legal entities, as well as foreign countries. 
32 Article 134: State- or communally owned land plots slated for sale to subjects 
of entrepreneurial activity for construction shall be subject to competitive sale. 
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Article 135/1: Land sales shall be conducted by auction or competition. 
33 A factor that contributes to that phenomenon is that under socialist 
property rule land registry systems detonated because they lost their 
judicial and economic significance. 
34 This attitude partially explains the reluctance of many Ukrainians to give 
away their land to foreigners. 
35 This attitude is not completely foreign to some Westerners either. If you 
suggest to a German farmer to abstain from cultivating her land, she might be 
very reluctant to do so, although the compensation she would receive 
could be equal, or in certain cases even higher, than the yield she would get 
after selling the crop. 
36 An institutional equilibrium arises if a system of formal rules (e.g. a formal 
property system) is completed by a system of informal rules and the respective 
enforcement arrangements. For this to happen, as mentioned already, values 
and social norms need to adapt to the new circumstances, hopefully informed 
by a high level of public discussion. Furthermore, a high amount of specific 
investment into politics and education is decisive. 
37 Land Code, Chapter 34: The State Land Cadastre; unofficial translation from 
Ukrainian. 
38 The following is drawn from the paper "W esentliche agrarpolitische 
Entwicklungen in der Ukraine im Jahr 200 I" by Ludwig Striewe, member of 
the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, University of 
Gottingen. 
39 Ukraine submitted its official application for WTO accession in November 
1993. 
40 The use of indicative prices is banned under Article VII of GATT. 
41 Decree No. 832, June 2000, raised the spectre of export certification. Together 
with measures such as mandatory crop insurance (January 2001) this decree 
opens a whole range of possible interference with grain exports. 
42 All these measures undermine the Ukrainian Law "On State Regulation of 
Import of Agricultural Products" (Article 5), stipulating that "[ ... } local 
governments are forbidden to ban the movement of goods among rayons and 
oblasts, to oblige farmers to deal with particular food processors and 
purchasers of agricultural products, as well as to set minimum farm-gate and 
wholesale prices ". This clash between the official commitment to trade 
liberalism on the one hand, and the imposition of all kinds of trade barriers on 
the other, definitely does not promote any confidence in state policies. It 
creates a climate of uncertainty and distrust. 
43 In .. Policies and Agricultural Development in Ukraine" p. 69 
44 Another danger arising from over-regulation and the huge tax burden for the 
formal sector is he transformation of business to the informal sector. 
45 Personalised income support and education programmes 
46 By enhancing transparency in this way, uniform accounting standards are an 
important means to solve principal-agent problems. 
47 Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 1461 "On Measures to Stabilise 
Agricultural Production" 
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48 Law "On Writing Off and Restructuring the Debts offarms and Procurement 
Organisations on State Budget Loans" from 24 September 1999 
49 The number of farm workers per 100 hectare was 8.3 in 2000. This number is 
expected to shrink considerably. Unfortunately, the government has still not 
developed a consistent policy to deal with the consequences of this process. 
50 Here the significance of investment into human capital and modern technology 
becomes apparent. 
51 The rather lax attitude towards debt repayment, developed under communism 
and nourished in the first years after independence by regular debt write-offs, 
reinforces the problem. 
52 This inability is reinforced by the lack of the application of uniform 
accounting standards. Many enterprises also engage in double-book keeping. 
53 Information asymmetry is understood here in the way described in the 
principal-agent model. 
54 Interest rates in the Ukraine have after independence have always been well 
above 20 per cent. 
55 The term "credit" can be traced back to the Latin verb "credere", which means 
"to believe", "to trust". 
56 Other measures that were more costly were the writing off of tax debts and the 
exemptions of agricultural enterprises from VAT. 
57 The inefficiency of the social insurance system is partly due to the overlapping 
ofbenefits and subsidies. For instance overlaps occur between social 
insurance payments and government social expenditure on the one hand and 
enterprises' social expenditure on the other. 
58 The social security contribution rates in Belarus and the Ukraine are the 
highest in Europe, above all because the Chernobyl accident in 1986 was 
followed by the creation of a new social insurance fund (the Chernobyl funds) 
financed by an additional contribution on the gross wage ( 12 per cent of gross 
wage, reduced to 10 per cent in 1997) to alleviate the consequences. 
59 Even without mentioning that this quasi-tax on farmers works as a production 
disincentive. 
60 In the case of price intervention in the sugar market 1998, definitely not all 
"preferential sugar" ended up being sold over the counter. Traders who had 
access to it had strong incentives to sell it privately at higher prices. 
61 Another point worth mentioning is that as long as managers have only limited 
control over the expenditure of the enterprise due to expenditure on the social 
sphere, the owners (state, private owners) cannot hold them fully accountable 
for the success of the enterprise. This increases the information asymmetry, 
which is at the root of principal-agent problems and thereby increases the 
scope for rent-seeking and corruption. 
62 Suggestion for the development of these insurances and funds can be found on 
pages 174- 182 in Ukraine at the Crossroads. 
63 Especially endogenous growth theory recognises human capital as a factor of 
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production in addition to physical capital and the labour force. Some of those 
models explicitly assume beneficial externalities of investment in human 
capital. However, the degree of these externalities is still unclear. For instance, 
it is difficult to measure the beneficial externalities associated with the 
relatively expensive educational services such as higher education. 
64 When I visited the University ofKiev in 1998 one of the professors "jokingly" 
told me how honoured she felt to teach the children of Mafia bosses. 
65 Additionally, relatively low tax rates and few tax exemptions are desirable. 
66 In rural areas, for example, subsistence farming and casual jobs play a crucial 
role in providing employment and income opportunities for many. 
67 The costs of operating a business in the informal sector generally outweigh 
any tax savings anyway. 
68 Ann Fiorini, Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, 
1999 
69 IMF, n.d. "International Standards Related to Fiscal Transparency", Report of 
the Working Group on Transparency and Accountability, Washington, D.C., 
1998 
70 Philip Pettit: Republicanism, p.253 
71 See Oliver E. Williamson: The New Institutional Economics 
72 Here the principal-agent model is applicable. The state was the principal, while 
each of the successive levels within the hierarchical economic structure were 
both principal and agent simultaneously. Due to hidden action and hidden 
information on the part of the agents, inefficiencies occurred and agents would 
keep an extra-yield for themselves (commodities, extra time). This, in turn, 
weakened the standing of the principal. 
73 Orwell's "1984" makes this point clear in a very vivid and shocking manner. It 
was not for nothing that the book was forbidden under communist rule. 
74 Sadly enough, members of the secret service often diffused even those narrow 
circles. When people in Germany, for instance, were allowed to read their 
Stasi-files, many found out that close friends or even their spouses had been 
reporting on them for decades. The destructive effect that had on many human 
relationships and on the psyche of people in general, is definitely considerable. 
It will take a long time to recover from such experiences of betrayal and 
distrust. 
75 Of course, it would be interesting to research how far Western media had an 
influence on the changes, which took place in 1989 and to what extent it 
helped to glorify the Western value system and standard of life. 
76 Benedikt Herrmann from the University ofGottingen is currently investigating 
the consequences that the Stalinist terror system of fear and uncertainty had on 
people's patterns of behaviour. The behaviour acquired under such conditions 
is likely to be transmitted from one generation to the next. Opportunistic 
behaviour like free-riding and the lack of sanctioning of such behaviour within 
society is expected to be such a consequence. 
77 When I asked a Ukrainian friend of mine about the current situation in his 
country, he reminded me of the following saying: "A people gets the 
government it deserves". Although that might sound cruel, it stresses the 
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fact that government will only improve when people actively demand it. 
78 The trust created through this kind of co-operation is also a major precondition 
for the success of every foreign investment project. 
79 For useful information concerning the work of these institutions visit the 
following websites: 
http://www.worldbank.org; http:i/www.ebrd.com; http://www.usaid.gov 
80 The governments of high-income countries, which provide the funds for its 
operations, control the IMF. The U.S. government has apparently the greatest 
influence since it owns over 18 per cent of the voting shares in the Fund. Not 
surprisingly IMF programmes attempt to create the conditions that are likely 
to support U.S. interests and in particular the interests of U.S. based 
international operating ftrms. 
81 Needless to mention that this does not encourage foreign or domestic 
investment either, what is a pity, since encouraging private capital flows is one 
of the IMF's main development objectives. See G. Birds article "A suitable 
case for treatment? Understanding the ongoing debate about the IMF". 
82 The IMF has a particularly bad reputation when it comes to listening to local 
experts. 
83 See http://www.worldbank.org.cdf. 
84 Given the Government of the Ukraine's long-lasting ambivalence about 
comprehensive reforms, this makes a lot of sense. 
85 The T ACIS programme was launched by the EC in 1991 and provides grant-
financial technical assistance to 13 countries of East Europe and Central Asia 
aiming at enhancing the transition process in these countries. 
86 USAID is the United States Agency for International Development. 
87 For instance, under the World Bank's New Assistance Strategy for 2001-2003 
for the Ukraine, US $40 million are provided for the Social Investment Fund 
Project to support the development of community-based services for the 
worst-off in society; another US $ 65 million are provided for the 
Tuberculosis and AIDS Epidemic Control Project. 
88 The World Business Environment Survey, for instance, asks detailed questions 
about various dimensions of governance. It elicits, for example, speciftc 
information about the share of bribes paid in total revenue and on the 
percentage bribe fee "cut" in public procurement projects. With the 
participation of the EBRD, this enterprise survey is largely complete for 
transition economies. See also: "Governance Matters- From Measurement to 
Action" by D. Kaufinann, A. Kraay, and P. Zoido-Labaton. 
89 Apart from this, Internet access is expensive. The possession of a computer 
alone is considered to be a luxury. 
9
° For a full description of the project see USAID's Final Report by Kevin 
Covert: h.t.m)/www.g~(!..orgill_g_f_gQ.~LPQAPQf. 
91 PwC provided policy and strategy consulting. They designed new methods to 
accelerate free transfer and recommended share sale strategies to attract 
foreign investors and to meet IMF privatisation targets. 
92 See Final Report, p. 10. 
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93 It's worth mentioning that the list of speakers only contains the names of 
Ukrainian experts, who have made their experience in the Ukrainian 
privatisation process. 
94 For example, from 1997 the project assisted the Skvyrskyi Grain Processing 
Enterprises in Kiev oblast with every stage of privatisation (preparation, 
registration of the company, etc.) Employees now own almost 60 per cent of 
the company shares and have developed a business attitude that helped them 
to improve the performance of their enterprise significantly. 
95 
may they be Ukrainians or foreigners, potential investors or not 
96 Although the SPF did not meet the IMF target to privatise 442 grain elevators 
to 70 per cent by the end of June, 1999. For detailed privatisation data see the 
Annex of the Final Report, p. 40. 
97 It is still maintained in the ports. 
98 One might just hope that this kind of journalism does not copy the CNN-style 
in all the details. 
99 For a detailed account of the Ukraine Anti-Corroption Support Project see the 
Final Report submitted by MSI Management International: 
http://wv.'W.gov/democracy/anticonuption/p3/ukraine.doc . 
100 For a detailed account ofNGOs in the Ukraine see Assessment of Non-
governmental and Civil Society Organizations in Ukraine and Moldava (July 
2001, English) on http://www.usaid.kiev.ua. 
1010ne might think about Germany in the 1960s and 1970s as a comparatively 
harmless example. That was a period of change, but people were not poor 
today and rich tomorrow. Despite '68 they were not suddenly sexually 
liberated. Patterns of behaviour and attitudes have changed only gradually. 
102The German Government would do well in accepting that not every person 
from Eastern Europe or the FSU is a potential criminal. Locking people out 
of the country is not going to increase national security. On the contrary, 
people entering the country illegally will pose a more severe problem. 
103 See The Economist: Ukraine's General Elections, February 9th- 15th 2002, 
p. 27-28. 
104 Unfortunately that does not mean that the intimidation of journalists, the 
denial of access of some candidates to the media and slightly unbalanced 
news coverage are once and for all matters of the past. 
105 For the creation of their land registry, for example, Ukrainians are currently 
weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of the American version of a 
land registry and the German Grundbuch system. 
106 The only kind of design he accepts is the design of constitutions in 
accordance with the rule of Jaw. 
107 F.A. Hayek: The Constitution of Liberty, p.406 
108 Including both formal and informal institutions 
109 F.A. Hayek: The Constitution of Liberty, p.402 
130 
Bibliography: 
As lund, Anders. 1997. The Political Economy of Systematic 
Transformation and Institution Building. European Economy and 
International Relations. 
Aslund, Anders. 1999. Why has Ukraine Failed to Achieve 
Economic Growth? Unpublished paper. 
Binmore, Ken. 1998. Game Theory and the Social Contract 
Volume 2: Just Playing. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
Bird, Graham. 2001. A Suitable Case for Treatment? 
Understanding the Ongoing Debate About the IMF. Third World 
Quarterly, Journal of Emerging Areas, Vol. 22, No. 823-848. 
De Soto, Hernando. 2000. The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism 
Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else. New York: Basic 
Books. 
Elster, Jon. 1983. Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of 
Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Elster, Jon (Ed.). 1996 The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown 
of Communism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Elster, Jon. 1998 The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 2000. 
Transition Report 2000. London. 
German Advisory Group for Economic Reform. 1999. The Next 
1000 Days: An Economic Reform Agenda for Ukraine. Kiev. 
Gray, John. 1984. Hayek on Liberty. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Gray, John. 1989. Liberalism: Essays in Political Philosophy. 
London: Routledge. 
Hayek, F.A. 1960. The Constitution ofLiberty. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
Kaufinann, Daniel; Kraay, Aart; Zoido-Labaton. June 2000. 
Governance Matters: From Measurement to Action. Finance and 
Development. 10-13. 
Kukathas, Chandran. 1998. Hayek and Modem Liberalism. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Motyl, Alexander J. 1993. Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine 
after Totalitarianism. New York: Council on Foreign Relations 
Press. 
North, Douglas C. 1992. Institutionen, Institutioneller Wandel und 
Wirtschaftsleistung. Tiibingen: Mohr Siebeck. 
North, Douglas C. 1997. The Contribution ofthe New Institutional 
Economics to an Understanding of the Transition Problem. UNO 
World Institute for Development and Economics Research, Wider 
Annual Lectures 1. 
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2000. Women and Human Development: 
The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Olson, Mancur. 2000. Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing 
Communist and Capitalist Dictatorship. New York: Basic Books. 
Pettit, Philip. 1997. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and 
Government. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
;; Plescovic, B'oris; Stiglitz, Joseph E. (Eds.}: 2000. Annual World 
Bank Conference on Development Economics 1999. Washington, 
D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development I The World Bank. 
Richter, Rudolf; Furobotn, Eirik G. 1999. Neue 
Institutionenokonomie: Eine Einfiihrung und kritische Wiirdigung. 
Tiibingen: Mohr Siebeck. 
Roggemann, Herwig (Hg.). 1999. Die Verfassungen Mittel- und 
Osteuropas: Einfiihrung und Verfassungstexte. Berlin: Berlin 
Verlag. 
Segbers, Klaus (Hg. ). 1998. Transformationstheorien Konkret: 
Wandel in der Ukraine, Belarus und Russland. Arbeitspapiere des 
Osteuropa-Instituts der Freien Universitat Berlin, Arbeiisbereich 
Politik und Gesellschaft. Heft 18/1998. 
Sen, Amartya. 1999. Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Siedenberg, Axel; Hoffinann, Lutz (Eds.). 1999. Ukraine at the 
Crossroads: Economic Reforms in International Perspective. 
Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag. 
Striewe, Ludwig. 2002. Wesentliche agrarpolitische Entwicklungen 
in der Ukraine im Jahr 2001. Vortrag zur Griinen Woche, Institute 
for Economic Research and Policy Consulting und Universitat 
Gottingen. 
Van Parijs, Philippe. 1995. Real Freedom for All: What (if 
anything) Can Justify Capitalism?. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Von Cramon-Traubadel, Stephan; Zorya, Sergiy; Striewe, Ludwig 
(Eds.). 2001. Policies and Agricultural Development in Ukraine. 
Hamburg: Alpha Print. 
Williamson, Oliver E. September 2000. The New Institutional 
Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead. Journal of Economic 
Literature. Vol.XXXVIII. 595-613. 
The web sites pointed out in the endnotes were visited between the 
4th and the 14th of February 2002 
For an update on current deveiopments of the Ukrainian economy I 
highly recommend the IER web site http://www.ier.kiev.ua. 
iii 
